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Summary Table1 
 2011 2012 2013 2014 2015 
Output (Real Annual Growth %)      
Private Consumer Expenditure -1.6 -0.3 -1.2 1.5 2.0 
Public Net Current Expenditure -2.8 -3.7 -0.5 -0.5 0.0 
Investment -9.5 -1.0 4.4 9.6 10.4 
Exports 5.4 1.6 0.1 3.7 4.0 
Imports -0.4 0.0 1.0 3.6 3.9 
Gross Domestic Product (GDP) 2.2 0.2 -0.4 2.6 3.5 
Gross National Product (GNP) -1.6 1.8 3.3 3.5 3.7 
 
    
 
  
    
 
Prices (Annual Growth %) 
    
 
Consumer Price Index (CPI) 2.6 1.7 0.5 0.3 1.0 
Growth in Average Hourly Earnings 0.4 0.9 0.0 0.0 1.0 
 
    
 
  
    
 
Labour Market 
    
 
Employment Levels (ILO basis (000s)) 1,849 1,838 1,881 1,933 1,985 
Unemployment Levels (ILO basis (000s)) 317 316 282 249 222 
Unemployment Rate (as % of Labour Force) 14.6 14.7 13.1 11.4 10.1 
 
    
 
  
    
 
Public Finance 
    
 
General Government Balance (€bn) -21.3 -13.5 -11.5 -7.7 -5.0 
General Government Balance (% of GDP) -13.1 -8.2 -7.0 -4.5 -2.8 
General Government Debt (% of GDP) 104.8 116.4 124.5 120.5 116.1 
 
    
 
  
    
 
External Trade 
    
 
Balance of Payments Current Account (€bn) 2.0 7.3 10.9 13.3 15.0 
Current Account (% of GNP) 1.5 5.5 7.9 9.3 9.9 
 
    
 
 
    
 
Demand 
    
 
Final Demand 2.2 0.2 0.0 3.1 3.7 
Domestic Demand -1.8 -1.6 -0.1 2.3 3.2 
Domestic Demand (excl. Stocks) -3.0 -1.1 -0.3 2.3 2.9 
      
Note: Detailed forecast tables are contained in an Appendix to this Commentary. 
 
  
                                                                                                                                                                                         
1  There are some minor differences between the numbers for 2012 and 2013 in this Commentary and the latest CSO 
data for the same years. This arises because the CSO have just published some minor revisions to their data for a 
limited range of aggregates for 2012. We have to use a full set of national accounts in developing our forecast so we 
have to link the CSO data for 2013 to the data for 2012 from National Income and Expenditure 2012. This gives rise to 
some minor discrepancies. When the CSO publish a full set of revised figures for 2012 and 2013 in June we will be able 
to use the full set of data for the next Commentary. 
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Summary 
GNP, which provides the best measure of the standard of living (and output) of 
Irish residents, is estimated to have grown by 3.3 per cent2 in 2013. This shows an 
economy that is recovering quite vigorously. The continuing improvement in the 
current account of the balance of payments, the rapid growth in employment and 
the signs of a pick-up in investment all point to a continuation of the recovery 
into 2014. As a result, on the basis of the information available to us today, we 
expect growth in GNP in 2014 of 3.5 per cent and that this pattern will continue 
into 2015, resulting in growth in GNP next year of 3.7 per cent. 
 
A consequence of this significant growth in output and employment will be a 
further fall in unemployment. The unemployment rate should be down to an 
average of 10 per cent of the labour force in 2015. However, this would still be a 
long way short of the long-term equilibrium rate of unemployment.  
 
The continuing increase in the surplus on the current account of the balance of 
payments is also a sign that the economy has not returned to long-run 
equilibrium; households and companies are continuing to deleverage at an 
exceptional rate. While this process continues growth in domestic demand will 
remain weak. However, there are signs of incipient growth in private investment 
and, as this trend develops, it will contribute to further growth in output and 
employment. Demand for accommodation in the Dublin area is now running 
ahead of supply and, until supply responds, this will put upward pressure on rents 
and prices. 
 
The public finances are improving more rapidly than envisaged in the 
government’s plan. If the forecast in this Commentary proves to be correct, 
government borrowing in 2015 is likely to come in below the target (3 per cent of 
GDP) once again, even without the substantial further cuts envisaged for the 
2015 Budget. However, in formulating fiscal policy it is best to err on the side of 
caution to ensure that budgetary targets are met in 2015. Nonetheless, these 
developments suggest that, after a long period of attrition, we are approaching 
the end of the very painful period of fiscal adjustment. However, there still 
remains the possibility of new shocks to the economy. 
 
Finally, there are major problems with the data available on trends in the Irish 
economy and there is a need to provide additional data that clarify the 
contribution to GNP of individual sectors of the economy. 
                                                                                                                                                                                         
2  Due to limited coverage in the CSO’s preliminary 2013 national accounts, our numbers are based on data from 
National Income and Expenditure 2012, linked to the latest CSO data. As a result, some marginal differences in growth 
rates arise for 2013. While we are showing 2013 GNP growth as 3.3 per cent, the official CSO number is 3.4 per cent. 
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National Accounts 2013 
A: Expenditure on Gross National Product 
 
 
2012 2013 % Change in 2013 
 
€bn €bn Value Price Volume 
Private Consumer Expenditure 82.6 83.0 0.5 1.7 -1.2 
Public Net Current Expenditure 25.1 25.1 -0.2 0.4 -0.5 
Gross Fixed Capital Formation 17.4 18.4 5.6 1.2 4.4 
Exports of Goods and Services 176.7 177.1 0.2 0.1 0.1 
Physical Changes in Stocks 0.4 0.5 
   Final Demand 302.3 304.1 0.6 0.6 0.0
less:     
   Imports of Goods and Services (M) 137.0 138.7 1.3 0.3 1.0
Statistical Discrepancy -1.3 -1.4 
   GDP at Market Prices 163.9 163.9 0.0 0.4 -0.4 
Net Factor Payments (F) -31.3 -26.1 
   GNP at Market Prices 132.6 137.9 3.9 0.6 3.3 
 
B: Gross National Product by Origin 
 
 
2012 2013 Change in 2013 
 
€bn €bn €bn % 
Agriculture 2.9 3.0 0.1 3.0 
Non-Agriculture: Wages, etc. 68.4 69.3 0.9 1.3 
Other 59.8 57.5 -2.3 -3.8 
Adjustments: Stock Appreciation -0.1 -0.1 
  Statistical Discrepancy 1.3 1.4 
  Net Domestic Product 132.3 131.0 -1.2 -0.9
Net Factor Payments -31.3 -26.1 5.2 -16.6 
National Income 101.0 105.0 4.0 3.9 
Depreciation 16.4 16.7 0.3 2.0 
GNP at Factor Cost 117.4 121.7 4.3 3.7 
Taxes less Subsidies 15.3 16.2 0.9 5.9 
GNP at Market Prices 132.7 137.9 5.2 3.9 
 
C: Balance of Payments on Current Account 
 
 
2012 2013 Change in 2013 
 
€bn €bn €bn 
X – M 39.6 38.2 -1.3 
F -31.3 -26.1 5.2 
Net Transfers -1.2 -1.4 -0.2 
Balance on Current Account 7.3 10.9 3.7 
as % of GNP 5.5 7.9 
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National Accounts 2014 
A: Expenditure on Gross National Product 
 
 
2013 2014 % Change in 2014 
 
€bn €bn Value Price Volume 
Private Consumer Expenditure 83.0 84.7 2.0 0.5 1.5 
Public Net Current Expenditure 25.1 24.7 -1.2 -0.7 -0.5 
Gross Fixed Capital Formation 18.4 20.8 13.2 3.3 9.6 
Exports of Goods and Services 177.1 185.7 4.9 1.1 3.7 
Physical Changes in Stocks 0.5 0.5 
   Final Demand 304.1 316.5 4.1 1.0 3.1 
less:     
   Imports of Goods and Services (M) 138.7 145.1 4.6 0.9 3.6
Statistical Discrepancy -1.4 -1.4 
   GDP at Market Prices 163.9 170.0 3.7 1.0 2.6 
Net Factor Payments (F) -26.1 -25.9 
   GNP at Market Prices 137.9 144.1 4.6 1.0 3.5 
 
B: Gross National Product by Origin 
 
 
2013 2014 Change in 2014 
 
€bn €bn €bn % 
Agriculture 3.0 3.0 0.1 2.5 
Non-Agriculture: Wages, etc. 69.3 70.9 1.6 2.3 
Other 57.5 60.6 3.1 5.5 
Adjustments: Stock Appreciation -0.1 -0.1 
  Statistical Discrepancy 1.4 1.4 
  Net Domestic Product 131.0 135.9 4.8 3.7
Net Factor Payments -26.1 -25.9 0.2 -0.9 
National Income 105.0 110.0 5.0 4.8 
Depreciation 16.7 17.0 0.3 2.0 
GNP at Factor Cost 121.7 127.0 5.4 4.4 
Taxes less Subsidies 16.2 17.1 0.9 5.7 
GNP at Market Prices 137.9 144.1 6.3 4.6 
 
C: Balance of Payments on Current Account 
 
 
2013 2014 Change in 2014 
 
€bn €bn €bn 
X – M 38.2 40.5 2.2 
F -26.1 -25.9 0.2 
Net Transfers -1.4 -1.4 0.0 
Balance on Current Account 10.9 13.3 2.5 
as % of GNP 7.9 9.3 
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National Accounts 2015 
A: Expenditure on Gross National Product 
 
 
2014 2015 % Change in 2015 
 
€bn €bn Value Price Volume 
Private Consumer Expenditure 84.7 87.2 3.0 1.0 2.0 
Public Net Current Expenditure 24.7 24.2 -2.0 -2.0 0.0 
Gross Fixed Capital Formation 20.8 23.8 14.2 3.4 10.4 
Exports of Goods and Services 185.7 195.3 5.2 1.1 4.0 
Physical Changes in Stocks 0.5 1.0 
   Final Demand 316.5 331.6 4.8 1.1 3.7 
less:     
   Imports of Goods and Services (M) 145.1 152.2 4.9 1.0 3.9 
Statistical Discrepancy -1.4 -1.4 
   GDP at Market Prices 170.0 178.0 4.7 1.2 3.5 
Net Factor Payments (F) -25.9 -26.7 
   GNP at Market Prices 144.1 151.3 4.9 1.2 3.7 
 
B: Gross National Product by Origin 
 
 
2014 2015 Change in 2015 
 
€bn €bn €bn % 
Agriculture 3.0 3.1 0.1 2.5 
Non-Agriculture: Wages, etc. 70.9 73.6 2.8 3.9 
Other 60.6 64.7 4.0 6.8 
Adjustments: Stock Appreciation -0.1 -0.1 
  Statistical Discrepancy 1.4 1.4 
  Net Domestic Product 135.9 142.7 6.0 5.0
Net Factor Payments -25.9 -26.7 -0.8 3.3 
National Income 110.0 116.0 6.0 5.4 
Depreciation 17.0 17.6 0.5 3.0 
GNP at Factor Cost 127.0 133.5 6.5 5.1 
Taxes less Subsidies 17.1 17.7 0.6 3.6 
GNP at Market Prices 144.1 151.3 7.1 4.9 
 
C: Balance of Payments on Current Account 
 
 
2014 2015 Change in 2015 
 
€bn €bn €bn 
X – M 40.5 42.9 2.5 
F -25.9 -26.7 -0.8 
Net Transfers -1.4 -1.4 0.0 
Balance on Current Account 13.3 15.0 1.6 
as % of GNP 9.3 9.9  
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The International Economy 
 
The international economy in 2014 and 2015 is expected to be more favourable 
to Ireland than it was in 2013. Of particular relevance is growth in Ireland’s main 
trading partners; the Euro Area, United Kingdom and United States. Following 
two consecutive years of contraction, Real GDP in the Euro Area is expected to 
grow by just over 1 per cent this year and 1.5 per cent in 2015. Prospects for the 
economies in the United States and the United Kingdom are more encouraging, 
with growth of approximately 2.5 to 3 per cent forecast for the coming two years. 
As shown in Figure 1, at present there is a wider distribution of forecasts for the 
Euro Area and the UK than there is for the US. 
 
FIGURE 1 Real GDP Growth (% change, year on year) 
               Euro Area               United States             United Kingdom 
      
 
Sources:  FocusEconomics, Eurostat, IMF, OECD, HM Treasury and Federal Reserve. 
 
The Euro Area Economy 
The European Central Bank (ECB) has left its main refinancing rate, marginal 
lending rate and deposit rate unchanged at 0.25 per cent, 0.75 per cent and 0.00 
per cent, respectively, since November 2013. In addition, no decision was taken 
in April on the implementation of a quantitative easing programme.  The ECB 
currently sterilises bond purchases using bank deposits, ensuring that these 
purchases do not lead to inflation. As measured by the Harmonised Index of 
Consumer Prices, annual inflation in the Euro Area was 0.5 per cent in March, 
considerably below its target of just under 2 per cent. Furthermore, there was 
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weak growth in money supply in February, with annual growth of 1.3 per cent in 
the broad monetary aggregate M3. Loans to the private sector also fell by 2.2 per 
cent in February. The ECB therefore faces challenges in fulfilling its price stability 
mandate and in supporting recovery in Europe. 
 
Decision was reached in March between the European Parliament and member 
states relating to the Single Resolution Mechanism (SRM) for dealing with failing 
banks. The SRM is intended to contribute to breaking the link between failing 
banks and sovereigns. Supervision by the ECB, rather than by national authorities, 
of some of Europe’s largest banks plays another part in this. Whether the SRM 
will fulfil its intended role is an open question. The process needs to be swift to 
avoid the possibility of damaging bank runs, however the decision-making 
process outlined in the SRM remains lengthy and requires input from national 
governments. Since the last Commentary, negotiations have led to greater and 
quicker mutualisation of the contributions from member states into a single fund, 
although this will still take eight years to complete. 
 
Euro Area GDP rose by 0.5 per cent year on year in the fourth quarter of 2013. 
Each of the previous three quarters had registered negative year-on-year growth. 
GDP grew by 1.1 per cent in the EU28 in the fourth quarter. Employment in the 
Euro Area rose 0.1 per cent quarter on quarter in Quarter 4, but fell by 0.5 per 
cent year on year. 
 
The US Economy 
Since the last Commentary, the US labour market has displayed relatively weak 
growth. In the year to November, the Labor Department’s Non-Farm Payrolls 
survey posted average monthly job creation of 205,000. Record-breaking cold 
weather in the United States in December and January contributed to lower jobs 
growth of 84,000 and 144,000, respectively. Stronger employment growth 
returned in February and March, with 197,000 and 192,000 jobs added in those 
months. The unemployment rate now stands at 6.7 per cent, down from annual 
averages of 8.1 per cent and 7.4 per cent for 2012 and 2013 respectively. 
 
The Federal Reserve had included a reference to an unemployment rate 
threshold of 6.5 per in its monetary policy forward guidance, but this has since 
been removed. The Federal Open Market Committee has, like the Bank of 
England’s Monetary Policy Committee, moved toward the consideration of a 
broader range of labour market indicators for policy. The Fed now emphasises 
long-term unemployment, under-employment and the participation rate in its 
policy decisions, with participation currently at the lowest rate seen since the 
1970s. The Fed continued to taper its quantitative easing programme in March, 
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cutting its monthly asset purchases by $10 billion to $55 billion. At its height, the 
programme involved monthly purchases of $85 billion. 
 
GDP growth fell to an annual rate of 2.6 per cent in the fourth quarter, from 4.1 
per cent in the previous quarter, despite the strongest growth in consumer 
spending for three years. The overall weaker performance in the fourth quarter 
has also been attributed to the severe weather. Performance continued to 
deteriorate in January but has showed signs of a rebound in February. Retail sales 
followed a 0.6 per cent fall with growth of 0.3 per cent in February and factory 
production grew by 0.8 per cent after January’s fall of 0.9 per cent, the largest 
since May 2009. 
 
The UK Economy 
The economy of the United Kingdom grew by 0.7 per cent in volume terms in the 
fourth quarter of 2013, contributing to GDP growth of 1.7 per cent for 2013. In 
addition, the Office for National Statistics has revised upward GDP growth rates 
from the first quarter of 2012 onward. Household consumption has been the 
biggest driver of the recent recovery in UK GDP growth, rising for the ninth 
consecutive quarter and by 2.4 per cent year-on-year in Quarter 4 2013. Gross 
Fixed Capital Formation also played an important role, increasing by 2.4 per cent 
in the fourth quarter, being driven predominantly by growth in business 
investment. Net trade provided less of a drag on the UK economy in 2013, with 
exports rising by 1 per cent and imports rising by 0.5 per cent. 
 
However, 23 quarters from the start of the economic downturn, the output of the 
UK economy remains 1.4 per cent below the 2007 peak, with only the services 
sector having returned to 2008 output levels. This represents a significantly 
longer duration before recovery in output than seen in previous downturns. By 
contrast, the US economy exceeded its pre-downturn peak within 14 quarters. 
Real GDP for the UK over the past decade is shown in Figure 2. 
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FIGURE 2 United Kingdom Real GDP, 2004-2013 
 
Source:  Office for National Statistics, Quarterly National Accounts. 
Note: PCE includes expenditure by non-profit institutions, GFCF includes changes in stocks, net trade includes statistical discrepancy. 
 
The labour market recovery in the UK has continued since the last Commentary; 
employment gains in the fourth quarter were 193,000, pushing the employment 
rate up 0.3 percentage points to 72.1 per cent. The unemployment rate fell by 0.4 
percentage points from the previous quarter to 7.2 per cent in Quarter 4, with 
the number unemployed falling by 125,000 to 2.34 million. UK unemployment 
peaked at an annual average of 8.1 per cent in 2011. The labour force 
participation rate in the UK is currently 76.8 per cent, higher than the US (72.5 
per cent) and Ireland (69.8 per cent).  
 
In the year to February 2014, the inflation rate in the UK (as measured by the 
Consumer Price Index) was 1.7 per cent, down from an annual rate of 1.9 per 
cent in January 2013. January represented the first time in the previous four 
years that the inflation rate was below 2 per cent. Real wages have continued to 
decline despite an increase of 1.3% in average weekly earnings year-on-year 
between November 2013 and January 2014. 
 
The World Economy 
In its Global Economic Forecast, the National Institute of Economic and Social 
Research (NIESR) expects world growth of 3.7 per cent in 2014 and 2015, 
increasing from 3.1 per cent in 2013. NIESR highlights the slow pace of this 
recovery by historical standards, and points to deteriorating growth prospects in 
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certain economies. While the economic prospects of advanced economies, 
particularly the US, have continued to improve, there is a weakening outlook for 
emerging markets such as Russia, India, Brazil, Turkey and China.  
 
The Russian economy is likely to be affected by current international political 
tensions; following the annexation of Crimea, the Rouble fell to record lows 
versus the Dollar and Euro. This prompted the Bank of Russia to raise its main 
borrowing rate from 5.5 to 7 per cent, a move which will not be conducive to the 
growth of a currently weak economy. Russian stock market indices have also 
dropped since the start of the crisis, with foreign sanctions causing them to fall 
further. Fallout from the Ukraine crisis has been noted in the March edition of the 
Ifo Business Confidence Index, a monthly survey of 7,000 German businesses. The 
Index fell for the first time in five months, with the drop in business expectations 
being attributed to the Ukraine crisis in particular. 
 
The gradual slowdown in Chinese activity appears to be on-going; consumer 
spending, industrial production and investment recently posted their worst 
results for three, five and 11 years respectively. This has prompted an 
expectation that the People’s Bank of China may loosen monetary policy in an 
effort to stimulate the economy. Meanwhile, the Bank of Japan may also choose 
to ease monetary policy further by expanding asset purchases. Growth in the 
Japanese economy slowed in the second half of 2013, after posting relatively 
strong growth in the first half. Growth in exports proved disappointing in 2013, 
with Japan’s current account deficit expanding to a record ¥1.6 trillion ($15 
billion). 
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Growth and Output 
 
Over the last two years it has become increasingly difficult to unravel recent 
trends in the economy, much less to forecast developments in the coming year. 
The release, in March of this year, of the National Accounts for 2013 raises more 
questions about what is happening in the economy than it answers. The most 
striking problem which these data pose for those watching the Irish economy is 
the dramatically different trajectory of real GDP and real GNP. The standard 
measure that is focused on internationally, GDP, fell by 0.3 per cent in 2013, 
while real GNP rose by 3.3 per cent. We know that GNP is the most appropriate 
measure of the standard of living in Ireland, as it leaves out the profits of 
multinationals that properly belong to their foreign owners rather than to those 
living in Ireland (as well as excluding national debt interest paid abroad). 
However, this is less easily explained to an international audience. The very wide 
divergence in the trends manifested by the two measures requires explanation.  
 
FIGURE 3 Gap between Growth Rate of Real GNP and Real GDP, Percentage Points 
 
Source:  Central Statistics Office and ESRI Forecasts. 
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Also, as shown by the seven year moving average, while for many years GDP 
grew more rapidly than GNP, this pattern has reversed. This reflects a change in 
behaviour by the multinational sector of the economy.  
 
There are a number of factors giving rise to this very large difference between 
the two measures of output. As discussed in the Autumn 2013 Commentary 
(FitzGerald, 2013a) and in Enright and Dalton (2013)3, the ending of patents on 
some pharmaceuticals was a major reason for the difference in trend in GDP 
and GNP in 2012, and the effects of this change have also influenced the figures 
for 2013.  
 
The so called “patent cliff” has affected the data through its effects on the value 
of sales and, hence, of exports. In turn this has led to a large drop in profits and 
value added arising in the pharmaceutical sector in Ireland, with concomitant 
knock-on effects on GDP.4 However, when the reduced outflow of profits 
abroad is taken into account, there is little effect on GNP.5 For 2014 it would 
appear that the effect of drugs dropping out of patent will be much smaller than 
in 2012 and 2013. Hence, we are forecasting a smaller gap between the growth 
rates in these two measures of output in 2014 and very little difference between 
the two measures in 2015. 
 
However, at least one other factor has come into play in recent years, which is 
further adding to the difference between the two measures of growth. This is 
the behaviour of firms in the broad ICT sector6. In 2012 and 2013 there was 
significant growth in employment in this sector. However, there has also been a 
trend increase in the share of the total turnover going abroad to pay royalties on 
the intellectual property used in the sector, reducing the share of domestic 
value added in total turnover. Thus, while there has been very rapid growth in 
exports of IT services in recent years, value added has grown much more slowly. 
The national accounts data show that in 2012, while the wage bill increased by 
around 20 per cent, there was no increase in profits. Foreign firms operating in 
the sector, instead of earning profits in Ireland from the substantial increase in 
sales in 2012, chose to pay increased royalty payments abroad, reducing their 
                                                                                                                                                                                         
3  See FitzGerald, J., (2013a), “The Effect on Major Accounting Aggregates of the Ending of Pharmaceutical Patents”, ESRI 
Research Note 2013/2/1, published in Quarterly Economic Commentary, Autumn, Dublin: Economic and Social 
Research Institute, and Dalton, M. and S. Enright, (2013), “The Impact of The Patent Cliff on Pharma-Chem Output in 
Ireland”, Working Paper no. 1, 2013. Dublin: The Department of Finance. 
4  The evidence available suggests that the major impact of the loss of patents has been on profits arising in Ireland 
rather than on patent royalties paid abroad. This has maximised the impact on GDP. 
5  To the extent that corporation tax payments are reduced consequent on the reduction in profits there would be an 
effect on GNP as well. However, with a tax rate of 12.5 per cent, at a maximum the effect on GNP would be one-
eighth of the effect on GDP. 
6  NACE sectors 58, 62 and 63. 
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profits in Ireland.  By paying royalties to an affiliated company abroad they 
reduce their tax liabilities in Ireland. 
 
In 2013 value added in the distribution and ICT sector7 actually fell by over 2 per 
cent in real terms, having a significant negative effect on GDP. This was probably 
primarily due to the reduction in ICT profits earned in Ireland, as all the evidence 
would point to a simultaneous increase in employment in the sector. Because 
virtually all of the profits of these foreign owned IT firms flow back out of the 
country, the fall in value added has no effect on GNP. In fact, because of the rise 
in employment and the associated wage bill, the sector may have made a 
significant positive contribution to the rise in GNP in 2013. While the effects of 
the patent cliff may be wearing off in 2014, the changing behaviour of the IT 
sector may have a continuing negative effect on GDP this year. This is reflected 
in our forecast for GDP in 2014. 
 
This analysis suggests that, when trying to understand underlying movements in 
real income in Ireland in 2012, 2013 and 2014, it is the trend in GNP rather than 
GDP which warrants greater attention. On this basis, 2013 marked a very 
successful return to growth in the Irish economy, something that is not apparent 
in the headline GDP figure. However, GDP is the measure conventionally used 
when comparing economic growth across countries. Thus, what is a domestic 
success story may appear to much of the outside world as continued economic 
stagnation. The arcane issues underlying developments in the economy are 
difficult to explain to an international audience. 
 
These unusual developments have a major impact on sectoral GDP on the 
output side of the national accounts, and also on exports and factor flows on the 
expenditure side of the accounts. This means that while the short-term 
indicators used for forecasting may suggest that exports are falling or stagnant, 
the domestic value added from those exports may actually be rising. Similarly, 
what may look like a fall in the short-term indicators for manufacturing output 
may actually translate into an increase in GNP. This difficulty in interpreting key 
short-term data greatly hampers our ability to track what is happening in the 
economy in real time.  
 
For these reasons, in developing our forecasts for the economy we place 
considerable reliance on the changes in the current account of the balance of 
payments and also on the growth in employment. In the period 2012-15 these 
                                                                                                                                                                                         
7  In the preliminary national accounts the CSO aggregate the distribution and the ICT sectors. 
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two key aggregates are not likely to be seriously affected by the unusual 
developments in the Irish economy set out above. 
 
In the case of the current account surplus, it is well known that over the period 
2009-12, the effect of redomiciled PLCs moving to Ireland served to artificially 
improve the balance on current account (FitzGerald, 2013b).8  However, with 
the relocation of these firms to Ireland completed, this factor ceased to affect 
the trend in the current account surplus in 2012 and 2013. As a result, the big 
improvement in the current account in 2012 and 2013 represents a real increase 
in value added accruing to the tradable sector of the economy from its sales 
abroad. Figure 4 shows the trend in the current account with and without an 
adjustment to exclude the effects of the redomiciled PLCs9. 
 
FIGURE 4 Current Account of the Balance of Payments, Adjusting for Redomiciled PLCs 
 
Source:  Central Statistics Office and ESRI Forecasts. 
 
The increase in the current account surplus in 2013 amounted to 2.4 percentage 
points of GNP, a large proportion of the total increase in real GNP of 3.3 per 
cent. Thus, sales of goods and services to the outside world by the Irish tradable 
sector accounted for much of the growth in GNP in 2013.  
 
                                                                                                                                                                                         
8  See FitzGerald, J., (2013b), "The Effect of Re-domiciled PLCs on Irish Output Measures and the Balance of Payments," 
QEC Research Notes 2013/1/2, published in Quarterly Economic Commentary, Spring, Dublin: Economic and Social 
Research Institute. 
9  It is assumed that the inflow of profits to these companies in 2013-2015 remains the same as in 2012. 
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However, with the data currently available it is not easy to allocate this growth 
in GNP to individual production sectors in the economy, given the major 
problems that exist with the traditional national accounting data. 
 
The Irish economy remains very competitive and the external environment in 
2014 and 2015 for firms in Ireland will be more favourable than it was in 2013. 
Hence we anticipate further significant demand from abroad this year and next 
year for the goods and services produced by the tradable sector. The effect on 
GNP arising in the tradable sector should be at least as high as it was in 2013. 
 
In terms of the current account of the balance of payments, as discussed later in 
this Commentary, for 2014 and 2015, we anticipate a further improvement in 
the surplus. However, the improvement will not be as great as it was in 2013 as 
the return to growth in domestic demand will result in a substantially greater 
volume of imports which will, to some extent, offset the effect of growing world 
demand for Irish goods and services. 
 
FIGURE 5 Productivity Measured as the Growth in GNP less the Growth in Employment 
 
Source:  Central Statistics Office and ESRI Forecasts. 
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discussed later in this Commentary, we expect employment to grow by 2.7 per 
cent a year in both 2014 and 2015, following on growth of 2.4 per cent in 2013. 
As discussed in a Box 1 in the Winter 2013 Commentary, the bulk of the 
employment growth is for those with third level qualifications. This reflects the 
pattern of growth in the economy to date; much of the growth has been in high 
skilled sectors with little employment growth in the building and construction 
and related sectors. 
 
In arriving at our forecast for GNP we take account of our projections for 
employment and add to that an estimate of the likely growth in productivity, 
measured in terms of GNP. Figure 5 shows the pattern of growth over the last 
forty years in productivity measured in this way. It also shows a seven year 
moving average of the growth rate in this aggregate. By this measure, 
productivity grew by over 3 per cent a year during the 1960s and the 1970s and 
again in the 1990s and the early years of the last decade. However, it had fallen 
back to around one per cent a year before the recession hit. Since 2005 it has 
stabilised at around that level. As a result, we are assuming in this Commentary 
a similar rate of growth in productivity to that experienced in recent years: one 
per cent a year in 2014 and 2015. This results in a forecast for GNP growth of 3.5 
per cent in 2014 and 3.7 per cent in 2015.  
 
Because of the complications affecting the national accounts, outlined above, it 
is much more difficult to forecast the growth of GDP. We anticipate that while 
the effects of the patent cliff on the national accounts will be more muted in 
2014 than in 2012 or 2013, the continuing changes in behaviour in the ICT sector 
will have some negative effect on measured GDP in 2014. Hence, we are 
forecasting that GDP in 2014 will rise by only 2.6 per cent. In 2015 we anticipate 
that these special factors will have fully played out and the growth in GDP of 3.5 
per cent will be close to the forecast growth in GNP.  
 
However, the particular uncertainty   associated with the GDP forecast must be 
emphasised. Depending on the accounting behaviour of relatively few 
multinational firms the growth in GDP could prove to be much lower than we 
are forecasting. By contrast a reasonable margin of error around our GNP 
forecast for 2014 and 2015 would be ±0.75 percentage points. 
 
Output 
As discussed above allocating the growth in output across sectors of the 
economy is very difficult under current circumstances. This problem particularly 
affects the tradable sector of the economy – manufacturing and distribution and 
software. 
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Agriculture saw very rapid growth in output in 2013 (Table 1). However, this was 
a recovery after a very bad year in 2012. Our forecast for 2014 and 2015 is for a 
return to relatively low growth of just over 1 per cent a year.  
 
TABLE 1 Industry and Output 
 
2012 2012 2013 2014 2015 
 
Value Volume Change 
 
€ billion % % % % 
Agriculture 3.6 -12.6 7.1 1.2 1.2 
Industry 38.1 -0.4 -3.8 -1.0 0.0 
Distribution, Transport, Software 
and Communications 36.2 -0.6 -2.7 1.0 3.0 
Public Administration and Defence 6.0 -6.3 -3.3 -2.0 -2.0 
Other Services 61.1 2.7 2.1 5.1 5.8 
GVA at Factor Cost 148.7 0.3 -1.0 2.4 3.6 
Source:  Central Statistics Office and ESRI Forecasts. 
 
Because of the legacy effects of the patent cliff, we anticipate a small further fall 
in industrial output this year, with no change next year. However, if firms adopt 
different accounting practices, there could be more rapid growth in measured 
output than we are assuming. 
 
The fall in output in distribution and software in 2013 appears to have been 
primarily due to changing accounting practises by some key multinationals in 
the IT sector. Once again, we anticipate some legacy effects pulling down 
growth in 2014 to only one per cent. However, for 2015, with the effects of the 
“patent cliff” coming to an end, we are assuming that these accounting effects 
will have played out and that the output of the sector will grow by around 3 per 
cent. 
 
The fall in public administration output is a function of falling numbers arising 
from a further tough Budget for 2014, with carryover effects into 2015. The 
Other Services sector, which is large in size, is expected to show vigorous growth 
both this year and next year, making an important contribution to the growth in 
economy-wide GVA at factor cost. 
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3 
 
Exports of Goods and Services 
 
 
 
The value of goods exports fell in 2013 by 4.6 per cent. To a considerable extent 
the fall was due to the impact of the pharmaceutical patent cliff, as discussed in 
previous Commentaries.10 Detailed trade statistics show that the decline was 
concentrated in exports of organic chemicals and medical pharmaceutical 
products. With annual average merchandise export prices showing a small 
decline of 0.8 per cent the volume of visible exports fell by 3.9 per cent in 2013. 
Data in the National Accounts release show that service exports exceeded goods 
exports again in 2013, growing by 3.9 per cent. Thus, total exports of goods and 
services were broadly unchanged from their 2012 level, showing a marginal 
increase of 0.1 per cent in volume and 0.2 per cent in value last year. 
 
 
 
 
With the international environment expected to show continued recovery in 
2014 and 2015 we are forecasting an improvement in the volume growth of 
merchandise exports, although it is important to note that these growth rates 
remain quite moderate. The main driver of export growth will continue to be 
the service sector, again aided by recovering economic growth and by increased 
capacity suggested by the number of service sector FDI projects announced by 
the IDA in recent years.  Thus, service sector exports are forecast to grow by 7 
per cent this year. While there may be some moderation in the growth level 
next year it is likely to remain strong at approximately 5.7 per cent. On the basis 
of these forecasts we are projecting an increase in the volume of total exports of 
3.7 per cent in 2014 and 4 per cent in 2015. While the export price deflator is 
projected to increase to approximately 1 per cent over the forecast period we 
are, therefore, forecasting that the value of exports of goods and services will 
grow by 4.2 per cent in 2014 and by 5.2 per cent in 2015.  
 
 
 
TABLE 2 Exports of Goods and Services 
 2012 2012 2013 2014 2015 
 
Value Volume Change 
 
€ billion % % % % 
Merchandise 85.8 -3.6 -3.9 0.0 1.9 
Services:  
   
 
   Tourism 3.0 -3.3 9.4 4.0 4.0 
   Other Services 87.3 7.2 3.7 7.0 5.7 
Total Services 90.3 6.9 3.9 6.9 5.6 
Exports of Goods and Services 176.7 1.6 0.1 3.7 4.0 
Sources:  Central Statistics Office and ESRI Forecasts.  
                                                                                                                                                                                         
10  See FitzGerald, J., (2013), “The Effect on Major Accounting Aggregates of the Ending of Pharmaceutical Patents”, ESRI 
Research Note 2013/2/1, published in Quarterly Economic Commentary, Autumn, Dublin: Economic and Social 
Research Institute, and Dalton, M. and S. Enright, (2013), “The Impact of The Patent Cliff on Pharma-Chem Output in 
Ireland”, Working Paper no. 1, 2013. Dublin: The Department of Finance. 
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4 
 
Investment 
 
The outlook for investment plays an important role in our forecast for domestic 
growth in 2014 and 2015. National accounts data show that overall investment 
grew by 4.4 per cent in volume and by 5.6 per cent in value in 2013, implying an 
investment deflator of 1.2 per cent. There was some variation across 
components, with building and construction growing by 11.6 per cent, due to 
growth in non-residential construction. Investment in machinery and equipment 
declined by 4.8 per cent. Purchase of aeroplanes can cause some volatility in this 
component and, once account is taken of these purchases, underlying growth in 
machinery and equipment investment amounted to 16.3 per cent. 
 
It seems likely that there will be a further increase in the volume of building and 
construction investment growth in 2014. Although, new house completions fell 
by 2.2 per cent in 2013, employment growth, economic recovery and low 
interest rates coupled with demographic factors are all contributing to housing 
demand at present. As outlined in the accompanying Special Article, (Duffy, 
Byrne and FitzGerald) demographic factors mean that approximately 25,000 
new households, on average, will be formed each year between now and 2030. 
While the number of dwelling units required will ultimately depend on 
obsolescence and the vacancy rate, the analysis suggests the number of units 
required is well in excess of current building levels. Indeed, this supply shortage, 
at a time when we are seeing growth in employment and continued household 
formation, has contributed to strong growth in Dublin house prices. The 
shortage of supply is also contributing to a similar picture with regard to private 
rents, with rental levels in the Dublin area showing strong growth in contrast to 
more subdued increases in the rest of the country.  
 
On the assumption that either private or banking finance is available, we 
anticipate that rising house prices, and the expectation of further price 
increases, will result in higher house completions in 2014 and again in 2015. 
Growth is expected to be higher this year and next, at 44.6 per cent and 25.0 
per cent respectively. Despite these strong growth rates the level to which new 
house building has declined since 2007 means these growth rates will only result 
in approximately 12,000 new house completions in 2014 and 15,000 
completions in 2015. 
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CSO data show non-residential construction grew by 17.7 per cent in 2013, 
while the volume of civil engineering production grew by 4.4 per cent. The 
improving economic situation, continued FDI flows, and employment growth 
should result in a higher level of investment in other building and construction 
both this year and next.  
 
With a more limited set of leading indicators it is more difficult to monitor 
investment in machinery and equipment. Registrations of new goods vehicles 
grew by 1.6 per cent in 2013, while imports of capital goods were 12.9 per cent 
lower in value terms. With machinery and equipment investment responding to 
some of the same factors as investment in building and construction, such as 
economic and employment growth, we are forecasting that this component of 
investment will increase by 2.5 per cent in 2014 and by 2.7 per cent in 2015. The 
overall volume of investment is forecast to grow by 9.6 per cent this year and by 
10.4 per cent in 2015. With activity levels anticipated to grow, we are 
forecasting an investment price deflator of approximately 3 per cent in each 
year. In value terms total investment is forecast to increase by 13.2 per cent in 
2014 and by 14.2 per cent in 2015. 
 
TABLE 3 Gross Fixed Capital Formation, % Change in Volume 
 2012 2012 2013 2014 2015 
 Value Volume Change 
 € billion % % % % 
Housing 3.1 -21.4 8.9 28.4 25.0 
Other Building 5.6 7.2 16.2 8.5 10.3 
Total Building and Construction 9.0 -4.0 13.0 15.2 15.8 
Machinery and Equipment 8.4 2.6 -4.8 2.5 2.7 
Total 17.4 -1.0 4.4 9.6 10.4 
Source:  Central Statistics Office and ESRI Forecasts. 
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5 
 
Prices, Consumption and Incomes 
 
Prices 
As measured by the Harmonised Index of Consumer Prices (HICP), the annual 
rate of inflation in the Euro Area was 0.5 per cent in March. This compares with 
a rate of 0.7 per cent in the previous month and a rate of 1.7 per cent in March 
2013. Falling energy prices have contributed to the low rates of inflation in 
Europe; annual inflation in energy prices stood at -2.3 per cent in February. The 
US Energy Information Administration (EIA) forecasts the price per barrel of 
crude oil to continue to fall over the medium term, suggesting falling energy 
prices will continue to affect inflation rates worldwide. 
 
In February, annual inflation in Ireland stood at -0.1 per cent as measured by the 
Consumer Price Index (CPI) and 0.1 per cent by the HICP. Falls in price were 
registered in the transport and housing, water, electricity, gas and other fuels 
divisions; two of the largest contributors to the Consumer Price Index. In 
particular, petrol, diesel, motor vehicles, mortgage interest and home heating 
oil showed falls in price. In addition, both food and non-alcoholic beverages 
declined in price over the 12 months to February. Table 4 provides our forecasts 
for the CPI, HICP and personal consumption deflator for 2014 and 2015. 
 
The European Central Bank (ECB) forecasts that inflation in the Euro Area will 
not rise to its target of just-under 2 per cent until 2017. While the ECB has not 
altered its monetary policy stance since the previous Commentary, it remains 
possible that the ECB will cut its main refinancing rate further, impose negative 
deposit rates or embark on a quantitative easing programme to ensure that it 
meets its inflation target. 
 
TABLE 4 Inflation Measures  
  2012 2013 2014 2015 
  Annual Change 
  % % % % 
Consumer Price Index 1.7 0.5 0.3 1.0 
Personal Consumption Deflator 0.6 1.7 0.5 1.0 
HICP 1.9 0.5 0.4 1.2 
 
Sources:  Central Statistics Office and ESRI Forecasts. 
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The Central Bank of Ireland’s Quarterly Financial Accounts for the third quarter 
of 2013 show that household debt declined by €1.6bn to €168bn during the 
quarter. This continues a deleveraging trend that began in the fourth quarter of 
2008, as shown in Figure 6. A measure of sustainability of this household debt 
can be derived by expressing the debt as a percentage of gross disposable 
income. This fell for the ninth consecutive quarter and now lies at 196.1 per 
cent. Both household debt and its percentage of Gross Disposable Income are at 
their lowest levels since the fourth quarter of 2006. Household debt to gross 
disposable income remains high by international standards, with the ratios for 
the United Kingdom and United States approximately 140 per cent and 110 per 
cent, respectively. 
 
Consumption 
The KBC Ireland/ESRI Consumer Sentiment Index fell slightly to 83.1 in March, 
from 85.5 in February. February’s value was the highest for the index since May 
2007. The 3-month moving average, a representation of the trend in the index, 
has now risen for 11 consecutive months. The Consumer Sentiment Index series 
also produces sub-indices which focus on respondents’ views of current 
economic conditions and their expectations for the future. Topics covered by 
the sub-indices include how consumers feel about their current financial 
circumstance compared to 12 months ago, the current buying environment for 
large household purchases, consumers’ views of their future financial situation, 
the path of unemployment and the economic outlook for the country as a 
whole. All of the sub-indices have displayed increases in the last year. 
 
FIGURE 6  Household Debt 
 
Source:  Central Statistics Office and Central Bank of Ireland. 
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The Nationwide UK (Ireland)/ESRI Savings Index examines savings behaviour and 
attitudes among Irish consumers. Recent editions of the Index have shown 
increases in regular saving, decreases in precautionary saving, and  increases in 
the proportion saving to buy or renovate a home. Furthermore, there have been 
improving assessments of current economic conditions. However, there were 
also increases in the proportion of respondents who do not save at all, who 
thought now was a bad time to save and who thought government policy was 
detrimental to saving, likely reflecting the impact of changes to DIRT in the most 
recent Budget. In an accompanying Research Note in this Commentary, Timoney 
(2014) examines data on savings behaviour by age and shows the age group 
with the highest tendency to save is those aged 21-35. This finding is linked to 
the housing market and net emigration, whereas a possible explanation for the 
reduced tendency of older age groups to save is a fall in precautionary savings 
and the effects of deleveraging and negative equity. 
 
The Retail Sales Index for 2013 rose 0.7 per cent in volume with respect to 2012. 
There was a value fall of 0.2 per cent, however, reflecting the impact of price 
changes. Retail sales growth improved significantly during the second half of 
2013 and in 2014 to-date, following a weak first half of 2013. The Index showed 
year-on-year volume increases of 3.5, 9.4 and 5.0 per cent in December, January 
and February, respectively. The January and February increases were 
particularly buoyed by the motor trades; there were 3.1 and 2.3 per cent 
increases with these removed.  
 
Registrations of new private vehicles for the first three months of 2014 were 27 
per cent higher than the same period in 2013, with an increase of 51 per cent in 
new goods vehicles. While 2013 was weak in terms of new vehicles, with a 6 per 
cent fall, there was growth in the registration of second-hand private and goods 
vehicles. The growth in goods vehicles in 2013 amounted to 59 per cent and 
similar growth has been observed thus far in 2014. In January 2013, imports to 
Ireland from Japan totalled €80 million in value. This increased in January 2014 
to €243 million, with imports of Japanese cars likely to have been a contributing 
factor. 
 
Incomes 
The Earnings, Hours and Employment Costs Survey (EHECS) produced by the CSO 
shows that Average Weekly Earnings rose by 1.5 per cent quarter on quarter in 
Quarter 4 but fell by 0.6 per cent on an annual basis. Annual earnings rose in 
nine of 13 economic sectors, including Professional, scientific and technical, 
transportation and storage and construction. Sectors such as education and 
human health and social work registered earnings decreases. Private sector 
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earnings were unchanged in the year to the fourth quarter, while public sector 
earnings fell by 1.5 per cent. Average weekly paid hours increased by 0.3 per 
cent for the economy as a whole, reflecting a 1.6 per cent increase in hours 
worked in the public sector with no change in private sector hours. Average 
hourly earnings fell by 0.9 per cent over the year; from €21.89 in the fourth 
quarter of 2012 to €21.69 in the fourth quarter of 2013.  
 
FIGURE 7 Real Wages, “Skilled” Real Wages and “Unskilled” Real Wages 
 
Source:  Central Statistics Office, own calculations. 
 
The EHECS provides nominal wage data which can be used in conjunction with 
measure of inflation to determine the path of real wages, as depicted in Figure 
7. Using the 2011 CPI as a deflator, real wages fell annually in each year since 
2009, with a fall of 1.1 per cent in 2013. Broadly grouping NACE sectors into 
“skilled” and “unskilled”, it appears that “skilled” real wage growth of -1.6 per 
cent in 2013 drove this decline. The Quarterly National Household Survey for the 
fourth quarter of 2013 showed annual employment growth of 3.3 per cent. As 
discussed in the last Commentary, the recent employment growth has been 
predominantly among those with third-level education. This may suggest that 
while many jobs being created are highly educated or “skilled”, the wage rates 
involved are lower than in the past. However, negative growth in real public-
sector wages over this period is also a possible contributing factor. 
 
Table 5 shows our forecasts for incomes and consumption. The continuing 
improvement in the labour market will contribute to falling transfers and to 
growth in total income received. As mentioned above, it is the growth in 
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employment rather than particularly strong growth in earnings which will drive 
the increase in income. Personal disposable income, which is income net of 
direct personal taxes, is forecast to grow by €1.2 billion to €91.2 billion in 2014, 
and further to €94.7 billion in 2015. The volume of consumption is thus forecast 
to grow by 1.5 per cent in 2014 and by 2 per cent in 2015, underscored by the 
improvement in sentiment and retail sales discussed above. 
  
TABLE 5 Personal Disposable Income  
 2012 2013 2014 2015 
 €bn €bn €bn €bn 
Agriculture etc. 2.9 3.0 3.0 3.1 
Non-Agricultural Wages 68.4 69.3 70.9 73.6 
Other Non-Agricultural Income 15.9 17.9 19.7 21.1 
     
Total Income Received 87.1 90.1 93.6 97.9 
Current Transfers 25.0 24.2 23.7 23.8 
Gross Personal Income 112.2 114.3 117.3 121.6 
Direct Personal Taxes 23.1 24.3 26.2 27.2 
     
Personal Disposable Income 89.1 90.0 91.2 94.4 
Consumption 82.6 83.0 84.7 87.2 
Personal Savings 6.5 7.0 6.5 7.2 
Savings Ratio 7.3 7.8 7.1 7.6 
Average Tax Rate (%) 20.6 21.2 22.2 22.3 
Source:  Central Statistics Office and ESRI Forecasts. 
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6 
 
Public Finances 
 
Since the then government put in place a medium-term adjustment programme 
in November 2010 the public finances each year have come in ahead of target. 
This has happened in spite of the fact that the rate of growth in the economy in 
2011 and 2012 was lower than had been anticipated at the time the plan was 
drawn up. The ability to outperform on the public finances, while the economy 
was underperforming, reflected the conservative nature of the public finance 
assumptions in the original plan and in subsequent Budgets. As a result of the 
outperformance, credibility has been rebuilt, both domestically and externally. 
Following on the crucial statement by ECB President Mario Draghi in the 
summer of 2012, that the ECB would “do whatever it takes” to preserve the 
euro, the gain in credibility of Irish policy has also seen the risk premium on Irish 
borrowing fall dramatically so that it is well below the levels anticipated even a 
year ago. This has had knock-on benefits, enabling the sovereign to successfully 
return to financial markets for funding purposes, following on the end of the 
EU/IMF programme, and also reducing the cost of the new borrowing. Thus, in 
planning for 2015 it would be wise to maintain this policy and to allow for 
unpleasant surprises along the way. 
 
Our estimate for 2013 is that general government borrowing was around 7 per 
cent of GDP. Based on our forecast for the economy in 2014 and on the 
assumptions set out in the Budget for this year, we anticipate that government 
borrowing will come in slightly below target in 2014 at 4.5 per cent of GDP (see 
Table 6).  
 
Our detailed estimates for revenue and expenditure for 2014 have not changed 
significantly since the Winter 2013 Commentary. The exchequer returns for the 
first two months of 2014 were significantly affected by changes in the national 
payment system, which meant that revenue, normally received within the 
month, was delayed until the beginning of the following month. However, for 
the latest month, March, the exchequer returns seem to be back to their normal 
pattern. They show revenue running significantly ahead of schedule, reflecting 
the pick-up in domestic demand. The rise in income tax receipts reflects the 
growth in employment and the higher than anticipated indirect tax receipts, 
inter alia, reflecting the big increase in car sales in January of this year. We have 
slightly reduced our forecast of corporation tax revenue for 2014, reflecting 
changing behaviour in the ICT sector and also the legacy effects of the patent 
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cliff on the profits of the pharmaceutical sector. If the progress seen in the 
March exchequer returns was to be maintained throughout the year our current 
forecast fall in borrowing could prove unduly conservative. 
 
TABLE 6 Public Finances  
 2013 2014 2014 2015 2015 
 €bn €bn % change €bn % change 
Income      
Taxes on income incl. Social insurance 28.7 30.4 5.9 31.6 4.1 
Taxes on expenditure 18.7 19.6 4.8 20.2 2.9 
Gross trading and investment income 3.4 3.0 -11.5 3.2 7.7 
Other Income 3.4 3.3 -0.9 3.8 15.0 
Total receipts : Current 54.1 56.3 4.0 58.9 4.5 
Total receipts : Capital 1.1 1.1 -0.9 1.3 12.6 
Total receipts - Current and Capital 55.3 57.4 3.9 60.1 4.7 
Expenditure      
Sudsidies 1.3 1.3 -1.5 1.3 -3.8 
National debt interest 7.6 7.8 3.6 8.0 1.8 
Transfer payments 26.9 26.4 -2.0 26.4 0.2 
Expenditure on Goods and Services 26.4 26.0 -1.3 26.0 0.0 
Total expenditure - Current 62.1 61.5 -1.0 61.7 0.2 
Total expenditure - Capital 4.7 3.6 -22.6 3.4 -4.7 
Total expenditure - Current and Capital    66.8 65.1 -2.5 65.1 0.0 
General Govt. Balance -11.5 -7.7  -5.0  
As % of GDP -7.0 -4.5  -2.8  
Source:  Department of Finance and ESRI Forecasts. 
 
This Commentary sets out our first forecast for 2015. With two exceptions, we 
have assumed indexation of the main tax and expenditure aggregates.11  
 
The first exception involves an assumption that new water charges will bring in 
an additional €500 million from households and companies in 2015. Until Irish 
Water is set up as a fully capitalised self-financing entity these charges are 
included under government miscellaneous revenue in the national accounts. For 
national accounting purposes they are then netted off government consumption 
on the expenditure side of the national accounts. In turn, this is reflected in a 
fall in the price deflator for this aggregate.12  
 
The second exception to the indexation rule is that we have assumed that, 
under the Haddington Road Agreement, there is no increase in public service 
pay rates in 2015, in spite of the fact that private sector pay rates are forecast to 
                                                                                                                                                                                         
11  The details of the indexation assumptions are set out in an Appendix to the Special Article in this Commentary on the 
structural deficit. 
12  An increase in revenue serves to reduce the net expenditure – hence the negative effect on the price deflator. 
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rise by 1 per cent. We have also assumed a small volume fall in this aggregate, 
due to carryover effects from the cuts implemented this year. 
 
The forecast for national debt interest in 2014 and 2015 is taken from our model 
of the dynamics of the national debt. 
 
The indexation assumption is applied to government transfers so that all rates of 
transfer payment are assumed to be increased by 1 per cent in 2015. In 
estimating total expenditure on transfers we use our Demographic Model 
(Byrne, FitzGerald and Žnuderl, 2012) to take into account the effects of rising 
numbers of children and older people in increasing demand. However, the fall in 
the numbers unemployed in 2015 will more than offset these demographic 
pressures. The net result of these different assumptions is a forecast that 
transfers will increase by around 0.2 per cent in 2015. 
 
In the case of tax revenue we assume that the average tax rate on all personal 
income remains unchanged in 2015, due to indexation of tax allowances and 
bands. We use the equations for indirect taxes from the HERMES model (Bergin 
et al., 2013) to forecast VAT and excise taxes. The significant increase in new 
dwellings forecast to be constructed in 2015 will also add to revenue from VAT. 
 
When taken together, these assumptions result in a forecast decline in general 
government borrowing to 2.8 per cent of GDP in 2015. This would be 
comfortably within the government’s target, in spite of the fact that the ex ante 
cuts we have assumed in the Budget for 2015 are significantly less than the 
government had previously planned (€2 billion). This reflects the forecast 
improved performance of the economy in 2014 and 2015. The result of such an 
outturn would be that the gross debt to GDP ratio would fall to around 116 per 
cent in 2015. 
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7 
 
The Labour Market 
 
For the first quarter of 2014 the Irish labour market has continued to improve. 
Monthly reductions have continued for the Live Register, while current indicators 
point to a broad-based expansion across many sectors and regions13. Annual 
employment growth has been positive for the past five quarters, while 
unemployment has been reducing for the past six. The standardised 
unemployment rate has fallen by over three percentage points from its latest 
peak of 15.1 per cent in the first quarter of 2012. Employment grew by 2.4 per 
cent for the full year in 2013, representing the strongest annual growth rate since 
2007. 
 
For the past three quarters, the Quarterly National Household Survey (QNHS) has 
shown a larger increase in employment than the fall in unemployment. The 
labour force participation rate has been rising over the same period. 
Encouragingly, the vast majority of employment gains have been in full-time 
positions, and the number of underemployed part-time workers has decreased. 
The gains to employment have taken place despite an ongoing reduction in 
public-sector employment. For the full year in 2013, public-sector employment 
fell by 1.3 per cent, more than compensated by 3.2 per cent growth in positions 
for the private sector. 
 
Analysis of annual data by age shows that the unemployment rate fell across all 
groups of the working-age population in 2013, with the exception of those aged 
60-64 (as shown in Figure 8). However, the reduction in the unemployment rate 
for those aged 15-34 is accompanied by falling employment and participation 
rates. Large net emigration and increased educational participation may be 
important factors for this cohort. As discussed in a Box 1 in the previous 
Commentary, the highest educational attainment of individuals who are 
employed and in the labour force has been steadily increasing since the onset of 
the crisis. Despite a modest increase of just 9,400 in the overall labour force for 
the full year in 2013, the number with at least a third-level qualification increased 
by approximately 40,000. Given the recent trend, this year will see as many 
people in the labour market with third-level education as with Leaving Cert/PLCs. 
 
                                                                                                                                                                                         
13  A recent report by IrishJobs.ie reports 5 per cent annual growth of job advertisements for Quarter 1, 2014: 
http://www.irishjobs.ie/careeradvice/wp-content/uploads/IrishJobs.ie-Jobs-Index-Q1-2014.pdf 
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FIGURE 8 Unemployment Rates by Age  
 
Source:  Central Statistics Office, Quarterly National Household Survey. 
 
Employment grew in 10 out of 14 NACE sectors in 2013. However, as discussed in 
the Winter 2013 Commentary, a caveat applies to the statistics for employment 
by sector due to adjustments to the sample of the QNHS. These adjustments 
were completed in the fourth quarter of 2013. The large growth in agriculture, 
forestry and fishing is thought to be particularly affected by this adjustments 
process, implying that the employment growth in other sectors is likely to be 
higher than what has been officially published. Accommodation and food 
services, and professional, scientific and technical activities also showed large 
increases. Taken together, these sectors added 41,000 jobs for 2013 compared to 
2012. The four NACE sectors with declines were public administration and 
defence, administrative and support service activities, transportation and 
storage, and financial, insurance and real estate activities. These sectors 
combined accounted for a loss of 10,000 positions. 
 
The occupational groups that have been most severely affected since 2007 have 
begun to recover in terms of employment levels. As shown in Figure 9, the largest 
growth in employment in 2013 was in skilled trades, where there was 7.2 per 
cent growth in employment (19,300 jobs). However, there are still 155,600 fewer 
people employed in skilled trades than in 2007. Elementary occupations (i.e., low-
skill requirement positions) increased by 11,100 last year (5.6 per cent) and 
professional employment grew by 7,600 (2.2 per cent). The only group that did 
not experience an increase in employment was caring, leisure and other services. 
Employment in this occupation group has seen little change since 2007. 
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FIGURE 9 Employment by Broad Occupation Group 
 
Source:  Central Statistics Office, Quarterly National Household Survey. 
 
Table 7 shows labour-market forecasts for this year and next year. Employment 
growth will accelerate in 2014 to 2.7 per cent, with similar growth expected in 
2015. Industrial employment is expected to grow in response to an expansion in 
construction and building activity. Further gains to services employment will arise 
due to higher economic growth in Ireland’s main trading partners, as discussed in 
Chapter 1. Unemployment will continue to decrease; the unemployment rate is 
expected to average 10.1 per cent in 2015, while the labour force and 
participation rate will rise. Net emigration will be lower at 18,000 this year, and 
while gross flows will remain large, this effect is expected to reduce for 2015. 
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TABLE 7 Employment, Unemployment and Net Migration 
 Annual Averages, 000s 
 2012 2013 2014 2015 
Agriculture 86 107 117 117 
Industry 336 343 354 372 
of which: Construction 102 102 109 119 
Services 1,415 1,431 1,462 1,496 
     
Total at work 1,839 1,881 1,933 1,985 
Employment Growth Rate, % -0.5 2.4 2.7 2.7 
     
Unemployed 316 282 249 222 
Labour Force 2,154 2,163 2,182 2,207 
Unemployment Rate, % 14.7 13.1 11.4 10.1 
Participation Rate, % 59.9 60.2 60.5 60.7 
     
Net Migration -34.4 -33.1 -18.0 -1.0 
Source:  Central Statistics Office and ESRI Forecasts. 
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8 
 
Imports and the Balance of Payments 
 
Imports  
In 2013 there was a small volume increase in both imports of goods and of 
services. This was broadly in line with the pattern of growth in 2011 and 2012. 
However, there was some compositional change as imports of aircraft were 
quite high in 2012, whereas they were much lower in 2013. Nonetheless, a 
recovery in imports of other types of goods, partly driven by a return to growth 
in investment, saw a growth in the volume of imports of around 1 per cent. 
Tourism imports (spending abroad by Irish consumers) once again showed a 
small fall. 
 
Trends in imports in the trade statistics have become hard to interpret, not only 
because of fluctuations in the imports of aircraft, but also due to another 
relatively new phenomenon affecting trade in pharmaceuticals. From time to 
time the trade statistics show a major import of pharmaceuticals in powder 
form. This powder is then pressed into tablets in Ireland and re-exported. This 
appears as both imports and then exports in the trade statistics. However, for 
national accounting purposes, because the powder remains the property of a 
foreign firm even while it is processed in Ireland, it is treated as never having 
entered the country – it is excluded from the national accounts measure of 
imports and exports. Instead the relatively small payment to the Irish firm for 
pressing the powdered pharmaceuticals into tablets is counted as a service 
export.  These flows of pharmaceuticals have been quite large in some quarters 
over the last two years, distorting the normal pattern of activity in the trade 
statistics.  
 
In 2014 we are anticipating a return to significant growth in domestic demand. A 
consequence of this will be an increase in the volume of imports. In particular, 
the forecast growth in investment will require significant imports. Looking at the 
latest months in the trade statistics, it would appear that there has been a 
significant pick-up in imports of machinery, consequent on higher levels of 
investment in machinery and equipment. 
 
For 2014 we forecast a rise in the volume of imports of 3.6 per cent increasing 
to 3.9 per cent in 2015. This growth in imports will be spread across both goods 
and services. Tourism imports by contrast, will show only a small increase of 
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around 1 per cent a year, reflecting the relatively weak growth in consumer 
demand. 
 
Balance of Payments 
As discussed earlier in the Commentary, the current account of the balance of 
payments showed significant improvement last year, rising from 5.5 per cent of 
GNP in 2012 to 7.9 per cent of GNP in 2013. The recovery, albeit mild, in the EU 
economy in 2014 should provide a more favourable environment for Irish 
exporters than that which prevailed in 2013. However, when taken together 
with the likely increase in imports triggered by the growth in domestic demand, 
the growth in the surplus in 2014 and 2015 should moderate. As shown in Table 
A5 in the Appendix, we expect the current account surplus to rise to 9.3 per cent 
of GNP in 2013 and to 9.9 per cent of GNP in 2015. If allowance is made for the 
earnings of redomiciled PLCs, this would still result in a surplus in 2015 of 5 per 
cent of GNP. While the trade data may be difficult to interpret, for reasons 
already explained, the increase in the current account surplus in 2013-15 shows 
how important is the stimulus to the economy from selling goods and services 
abroad. 
 
Such a continuing current account surplus would exceed the threshold for an 
alert under the EU Macroeconomic Imbalances Procedure. In the case of 
Germany, the result of such an excess was that the EU Commission launched an 
inquiry under the excessive macro-economic imbalances rules. However, in the 
Irish case, if appropriate allowance is made for the effects of the redomiciled 
PLCs on the current account, Ireland would still be below the relevant threshold 
in 2015. 
 
The improvement in the current account surplus in 2013 was fully accounted for 
by the drop in net factor income paid abroad. This reflected, inter alia, the 
effects of the patent cliff. In 2014 we expect a further small fall in this item. 
However, in 2015 it should begin to rise again, reflecting the rising profitability 
of the multinational sector located in Ireland. 
 
As well as the flows of profits to and from companies in Ireland, net factor 
income also includes the outflow of national debt interest payments. However, 
as discussed elsewhere in this Commentary, following on a very big rise in this 
item in 2013 there is expected to be relatively little further increase in 2014 and 
2015. 
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The large current account surplus forecast for 2014 and 2015 is not an 
equilibrium outcome for the economy. It reflects the massive continuing 
deleveraging by the Irish private sector. At some stage households and 
companies will go back to investing and consuming at a level commensurate 
with their income. This change in behaviour would see an escalation in the 
growth rate of domestic demand and of GNP. Provided the current account 
remained in surplus, such an increase in demand would be fully sustainable.  
This possible outcome was considered as part of the Recovery scenario in the 
ESRI Medium-Term Review, published in July 2013. 
 
TABLE 8 Imports of Goods and Services 
 2012 2012 2013 2014 2015 
 Value Volume Change 
 € billion % % % % 
Merchandise 49.5 -2.9 1.0 4.0 4.0 
Services  
   
 
    Tourism 4.6 -7.1 -0.9 1.1 1.1 
    Other Services 82.5 2.2 1.0 3.5 4.0 
Total Services 87.5 1.8 0.9 3.4 3.9 
Imports of Goods and Services 137.0 0.0 1.0 3.6 3.9 
Source:  Central Statistics Office and ESRI Forecasts. 
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9 
 
Monetary Sector Developments 
 
Bank Funding 
The continued scrutiny of the Irish banking sector was intensified in recent 
months with the publication of the preliminary asset quality review undertaken 
by the Central Bank of Ireland (CBI). Based on the first half of 2013, the review 
indicated that no additional capital was required, but each of the banks were 
obliged to make additional provisions for loan losses. These provisions were 
reflected in the banks’ annual returns for 2013. Irish credit institutions face 
ongoing difficulties in returning to profitability. In particular, the continuing 
presence of a large proportion of tracker mortgages poses a significant challenge. 
Although after-tax losses were still made for the full year, some improvement 
towards profitability is nonetheless evident. Progress towards bank profitability 
has been helped by the decline in interest rates offered to prospective deposit 
holders. Since August 2013, the weighted average term-deposit interest rate for 
Irish banks has fallen below that of the Euro Area, with the spread at minus 16 
basis points by February (Figure 10). This trend remains supportive for 
improvement to banks’ net interest margins. 
 
 
 
 
FIGURE 10 Average Households and Non-Financial Corporation Deposit Rates* 
  
* Average for deposits with outstanding maturity. 
Source:  European Central Bank, Bank Lending Survey 2014. 
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There have been important developments in recent months regarding plans for 
banking union in the Euro Area. Regulations forming the new Single Resolution 
Mechanism (SRM) have now been enacted for the resolution of banks that run 
into solvency difficulties. Initially, the SRM will entail individual-country bank 
levies funding a national reserve for domestic-bank resolution, which over time 
would be mutualised across countries in the Euro Area. Recent amendments 
require that 70 per cent of all funding set aside for Euro Area bank resolution be 
mutually pooled within three years, and 100 per cent within eight years. The 
European Central Bank (ECB) will carry out a stress test and asset quality review 
exercise on 128 large banks in the Euro Area. Results of this exercise will be 
available in October, ahead of the ECB assuming its new supervisory functions in 
November. 
 
FIGURE 11 Net Foreign Liabilities of the Banking System, January 2003 - February 2014 
 
Source:  Central Bank of Ireland, Money and Bank Statistics. 
Note:  Exceptional Liquidity Assistance relating to the promissory notes was withdrawn following the restructuring transaction in 
February 2013. 
 
Further progress has been evident in the external funding position of the banking 
sector. As shown in Figure 11, the ongoing reduction in liabilities to the Euro 
System has resulted in total net external liabilities of the banking system 
returning to a balanced position. The reliance liabilities to the Euro System stand 
at €36.6 billion, which is the lowest amount since April 2008. This constitutes a 
75.5 per cent fall from a peak of €138.2 billion in November 2010. 
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Bank Lending 
Lending to households and non-financial corporations (NFCs) has fallen further in 
recent months, continuing a long-establish trend beginning in 2009. Adjusted for 
non-transaction related effects (such as revaluations and exchange-rate 
movements), the supply of new credit to the private sector was outpaced by loan 
repayments in February by an annualised €4.2 billion for households and €4.7 
billion for NFCs. As households and NFCs repair balance sheets and service large 
outstanding loans, there is a danger that banks as currently configured will be 
unable to meet a growth in demand for credit that may be necessary for a firm 
economic recovery to occur (as discussed in the June 2013 Medium-Term 
Review). The withdrawal of competition in the lending sector has likely reinforced 
the falling demand for credit availability. This poses a challenge in an Irish 
context, as the real economy, particularly when compared with other countries, 
is heavily dependent on the traditional banking sector for finance. 
 
FIGURE 12 Annual Change in PDH Mortgage Arrears: Overall Balance and Accounts 
 
Source:  Central Bank of Ireland, Money and Bank Statistics. 
 
In Figure 12, the most recent mortgage arrears data are shown, with the fourth 
quarter registering the first annual reduction in overall arrears balance and 
accounts since the series began. While a significant challenge remains for banks 
to minimise their eventual loss exposure to existing arrears, the annual fall is 
nonetheless encouraging. 
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Box 1: Additional Data Needed to Understand Developments in the Economy 
by John FitzGerald 
 
Normally, when the Central Statistics Office (CSO) publish the first set of annual 
accounts for the previous year there are some surprises but the basic picture of 
what happened the previous year is clearer as a result of the CSO data. However, 
this year, when the CSO published its first estimate of GDP and GNP for 2013 in 
March, the picture of events in 2013 portrayed in the national accounts was 
thoroughly opaque. It could legitimately be asked whether the figures were “really 
good news” or “really bad news”, as the answer was not clear from the figures 
presented. However, with the help of the CSO’s commentary it became clear that 
the results were good news and that, because of arcane accounting issues, 
attention should be focused on the figure for growth in GNP rather than GDP.  
 
GNP, which provides the best measure of the standard of living (and output) of Irish 
residents, is estimated to have grown by 3.3 per cent in 2013. While it will probably 
be revised when a fuller range of data become available to the CSO in June (and 
again in subsequent years when the full range of historical data are available to the 
CSO), GNP shows an economy that is recovering quite vigorously. This conclusion is 
consistent with the data published simultaneously by the CSO on the current 
account of the balance of payments and, even more importantly, with the recently 
published figures for employment. 
 
What the experience of the last two years shows is that the standard EU 
harmonised national accounts are not a satisfactory framework for understanding 
what is happening in the Irish economy. Instead we have to rely on extensive 
commentary by the CSO on the figures that are published. Without this assistance it 
would not be easy to detect the very big effects on the published figures of issues 
such as the “patent cliff”, redomiciled PLCs, and changes in ICT sector accounting. 
These problems with the standard national accounts presentation arise from the 
exceptional openness of the Irish economy and the related globalisation of the 
tradable sector of the EU economy. To better understand what is happening in 
Ireland today significant additional data are needed, supplementary to the national 
accounts, which would show the contribution of each sector of the economy to 
GNP. The November 2012 release by the CSO, showing the data on GVA broken 
down my multi-national firms and the rest of the economy, would provide a good 
conceptual framework for these additional data. 
 
This lack of transparency poses particular problems for observers outside Ireland 
such as the EU Commission, the IMF, ratings agencies etc. The constant need to 
explain “special factors” affecting the Irish accounts could raise suspicion that 
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things are being covered up whereas, in fact, tremendous efforts are being made to 
be as transparent as possible within the confines of the harmonised EU accounts.  
 
Because Ireland is a pioneer in this field, there is no great enthusiasm at the EU 
level to develop rapidly the necessary ancillary accounts which would be more 
transparent. For most other countries in the EU these problems of accounting are 
much smaller, because multinational firms play a more limited role in their 
economies. For this reason we will have to act as pioneers in this field if we are to 
produce a fully transparent set of accounts for Ireland that explain what is 
happening in different sectors of the economy. 
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10 
 
General Assessment of the Irish Economy 
 
It has long been recognised that GNP provides the best measure of the standard 
of living (and output) of Irish residents. While, for international comparisons, 
the focus is normally on GDP, because of the problems with the national 
accounts (see Box 1), in developing our forecast for the Irish economy in 2014 
and 2015 we have adopted a top down approach and concentrated on the 
prospects for GNP. Instead of using the latest data on trade, industrial output 
etc. to build up a picture of GNP, we have relied on the current account of the 
balance of payments, the employment data, and indicators of what is happening 
to domestic demand as a basis for our forecast. We have then tried to “allocate” 
the aggregate level of economic activity across different sectors, using the 
published data and the CSO’s guidance on exceptional items. 
 
In the case of the employment data we are also handicapped by the very 
unfortunate timing of the rebasing of the Quarterly National Household Survey 
(to take account of Census 2011). This means that, while we have reliable 
information on the trend in total employment, we do not have good information 
at this point on the trend in employment in individual sectors. This is the first 
time in sixty years that reliable sectoral employment figures are not available 
and, unfortunately, this is happening just when we are experiencing major 
problems with a range of other data. This makes it particularly urgent that the 
CSO produces consistent sectoral employment data for the last decade, taking 
account of the rebasing that it has recently undertaken. 
 
A key feature of our forecast is the recovery in domestic demand. In our view 
this will be primarily due to an upturn in investment, including building and 
construction investment, both residential and non-residential. However, this 
recovery is at an early stage and so growth will only result in moderate increases 
in output levels (from a very low base). At the same time, there has been 
stronger growth in demand for dwellings. Having fallen for the past number of 
years, improving economic growth and continuing foreign direct investment 
flows have also resulted in an increase in investment in commercial 
construction.  
 
On the basis of the information available to us today, it seems likely that the 
Irish economy will grow slightly more rapidly in 2014 than in 2013. The rest of 
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Europe seems to be returning slowly to growth, which should enhance the 
external environment for Irish exporters. In addition, as noted here, there are 
clear signs of a pick-up in domestic investment. Thus our forecast for growth in 
GNP in 2014 is 3.5 per cent. These positive factors are expected to continue into 
2015 resulting in growth in GNP next year of 3.7 per cent. 
 
In a Special Article in this Commentary, Duffy, Byrne and FitzGerald show that,  
under a variety of scenarios, population growth and higher headship rates will 
result in 20,000 or more new households being formed each year in Ireland. This 
is much greater than the current level of new residential building; hence there is 
significant upward pressure on prices and rents in areas of high demand. It 
seems likely that house price increases will encourage some increase in 
residential construction, although we are still forecasting only a limited increase 
in 2014 and 2015 because of a slow response of the building and construction 
sector. Thus, demand will tend to run ahead of supply for the immediate future, 
resulting in continued price growth.  
 
As indicated in the Article, these demand pressures are likely to continue to 
grow beyond 2015, so that measures aimed at tackling supply constraints will be 
an important priority for the forthcoming strategy for the construction industry. 
Attention should be focused on any regulatory constraints that may impede a 
rapid supply response. The availability of finance for working capital for firms in 
the building and construction sector remains to be tested. Also, while mortgage 
finance has been available for the limited number of purchases of dwellings so 
far, it is not certain that it will be adequate to finance a significant expansion. 
New channels for funding may make some contribution to enhancing capital 
availability, but it will also be important that the banking system is able to 
respond to the changing economic environment. In the ESRI Medium-Term 
Review we considered a scenario where the recovery in the Irish economy was 
delayed, inert alia, because of a lack of availability of credit. If this were to 
happen it would be a significant policy failure delaying the return to sustainable 
growth. 
 
In another Special Article accompanying this Commentary, Bergin and FitzGerald 
discuss the problems with the EU concept of the structural deficit and we 
suggest a better measure of this key concept. The structural deficit is the deficit 
that would remain when the economy is at its potential level of output; it is the 
deficit that must be eliminated by raising taxes or cutting expenditure. The 
problem with the EU methodology has long been understood; for example, the 
Irish Department of Finance commented on the unrealistic nature of the EU 
approach a decade ago. However, in the absence of an agreed superior measure 
of the structural deficit, the current methodology is still used by the EU to 
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estimate the stance of fiscal policy as a basis for recommendations on the 
appropriate fiscal stance in individual countries. 
 
The HERMES model of the economy is used to develop an alternative more 
satisfactory measure of the structural deficit in the Article. The model is used to 
estimate the deficit that would remain when the economy has returned to long-
term equilibrium. On this basis, using the Medium-Term Review “Recovery” 
scenario, we estimate that, with a neutral fiscal policy from 2015 onwards, the 
public finances would move into long-term surplus by 2017. In other words, all 
of the forecast deficit for 2014 is accounted for by the fact that the economy is 
below its long-term potential level of output. Economic recovery alone would be 
enough to eliminate the remaining deficit over the following three years. 
 
However, this conclusion is based on the “Recovery” scenario proving correct. If 
Europe does not return to growth over the rest of the decade, or if policy 
mistakes made in Ireland delay a recovery, the conclusion on fiscal policy will be 
less benign. Thus it is too early to reach a firm conclusion on whether further 
cuts in public expenditure or increases in tax revenue will be needed in the 
Budget for 2015. It is only at the end of September, when more information will 
be available, that such a decision should be made. On the basis of the current 
forecast, the fiscal assumptions developed here, which are illustrative rather 
than normative, would ensure that Ireland would reach its target for reducing 
the deficit next year. The package of measures that we have assumed falls far 
short of the €2 billion in cuts originally pencilled in by the government for the 
2015 Budget. This suggests that, after a long period of attrition, we are 
approaching the end of the very painful period of fiscal adjustment. 
 
 
 
 
Detailed Forecast Tables 
 
 
 
 
FORECAST TABLE A1  Exports of Goods and Services 
 
2012 % change in 2013 2013 % change in 2014 2014 % change in 2015 2015 
 
€ bn Value Volume € bn Value Volume € bn Value Volume € bn 
Merchandise 85.8 -4.6 -3.9 81.9 0.8 0.0 82.5 2.8 1.9 84.8 
Tourism 3.0 10.4 9.4 3.3 4.5 4.0 3.5 5.0 4.0 3.7 
Other Services 87.3 4.6 3.7 91.3 8.5 7.0 99.1 7.2 5.7 106.2 
Exports Of Goods and Services 176.1 0.2 0.1 176.6 4.9 3.7 185.1 5.2 4.0 194.7 
FISM Adjustment 0.6     0.5     0.6     0.6 
Adjusted Exports 176.7 0.2 0.1 177.1 4.9 3.7 185.7 5.2 4.0 195.3 
 
 
 
FORECAST TABLE A2 Investment 
 
2012 % change in 2013 2013 % change in 2014 2014 % change in 2015 2015 
 
€ bn Value Volume € bn Value Volume € bn Value Volume € bn 
Housing 3.1 11.1 8.9 3.4 32.5 28.4 4.5 29.0 25.0 5.9 
Other Building 5.6 16.9 16.2 6.5 13.6 8.5 7.4 15.7 10.3 8.6 
Transfer Costs 0.3 2.5 1.2 0.4 18.7 12.0 0.4 18.7 12.0 0.5 
Building and Construction 9.0 14.4 13.0 10.3 20.1 15.2 12.4 20.7 15.8 15.0 
Machinery and Equipment 8.4 -3.8 -4.8 8.1 4.4 2.5 8.5 4.7 2.7 8.8 
Total Investment 17.4 5.6 4.4 18.4 13.2 9.6 20.8 14.2 10.4 23.8 
  
 FORECAST TABLE A3 Personal Income 
 
2012 % change in 2013 2013 % change in 2014 2014 % change in 2015 2015 
 
€ bn % €bn € bn % €bn € bn % €bn € bn 
Agriculture, etc 2.9 3.0 0.1 3.0 2.5 0.1 3.0 2.5 0.1 3.1 
Non-Agricultural Wages 68.4 1.3 0.9 69.3 2.3 1.6 70.9 3.9 2.8 73.6 
Other Non-Agricultural Income 15.9 12.6 2.0 17.9 10.3 1.8 19.7 7.2 1.4 21.1 
Total Income Received 87.1 3.4 3.0 90.1 3.9 3.5 93.6 4.5 4.2 97.9 
Current Transfers 25.0 -3.2 -0.8 24.2 -2.2 -0.5 23.7 0.2 0.1 23.8 
Gross Personal Income 112.2 1.9 2.2 114.3 2.6 3.0 117.3 3.7 4.3 121.6 
Direct Personal Taxes 23.1 5.4 1.3 24.3 7.7 1.9 26.2 3.9 1.0 27.2 
Personal Disposable Income 89.1 1.0 0.9 90.0 1.2 1.1 91.2 3.6 3.3 94.4 
Consumption 82.6 0.5 0.4 83.0 2.0 1.7 84.7 3.0 2.6 87.2 
Personal Savings 6.5 8.1 0.5 7.0 -7.7 -0.5 6.5 11.3 0.7 7.2 
Savings Ratio 7.3 
  
7.8 
  
7.1   7.6 
Average Personal Tax Rate 20.6 
  
21.2 
  
22.2   22.3 
 
FORECAST TABLE A4  Imports of Goods and Services 
 
2011 % change in 2012 2012 % change in 2013 2013 % change in 2014 2014 
 
€ bn Value Volume € bn Value Volume € bn Value Volume € bn 
Merchandise 49.5 0.4 1.0 49.7 4.7 4.0 52.1 4.7 4.0 54.5 
Tourism 4.6 -0.1 -0.9 4.6 3.6 1.1 4.8 4.6 1.1 5.0 
Other Services 82.5 1.8 1.0 84.0 4.5 3.5 87.8 5.0 4.0 92.2 
Imports of Goods and Services 136.6 1.3 0.0 138.3 4.6 0.0 144.6 4.9 0.0 151.7 
FISM Adjustment 0.4 
  
0.4 
  
0.4   0.4 
Adjusted Imports 137.0 1.3 1.0 138.7 4.6 3.6 145.1 4.9 3.9 152.2 
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FORECAST TABLE A5  Balance of Payments 
 
2012 2013 2014 2015 
 
€ bn € bn € bn € bn 
Exports of Goods and Services 176.1 176.6 185.1 194.7 
Imports of Goods and Services 136.6 138.3 144.6 151.7 
Net Factor Payments -31.1 -26.0 -25.7 -26.5 
Net Transfers -1.2 -1.4 -1.4 -1.4 
Balance on Current Account 7.3 10.9 13.3 15.0 
As a % of GNP 5.5 7.9 9.3 9.9 
 
 
 
FORECAST TABLE A6  Employment and Unemployment, Annual Average 
 
2012 2013 2014 2014 
 
000s 000s 000s 000s 
Agriculture 86 107 117 117 
Industry 336 343 354 372 
Of which: Construction 102 102 109 119 
Services 1,415 1,431 1,462 1,496 
Total at Work 1,839 1,881 1,933 1,985 
Unemployed 316 282 249 222 
Labour Force 2,154 2,163 2,182 2,207 
Unemployment Rate, % 14.7 13.1 11.4 10.1 
  
Special Articles
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Alternative Scenarios for New Household 
Formation in Ireland1 
*David Duffy, David Byrne, John FitzGerald 
 
Introduction 
Over the period 1995 to 2007 it is estimated that the Irish economy, as measured 
by real GDP, more than doubled. Accompanying the economic boom over the 
period 1997 to 2007 the Irish housing market grew significantly. This growth, 
apart from a short interruption in 2001, is reflected not only in house prices but 
also in other indicators which show a huge expansion of activity levels within the 
market. The rapid growth in the housing market was driven by strong economic 
growth, accompanied by employment growth and increases in disposable 
income. Demographic trends also contributed to housing demand, with strong 
population growth, particularly in the main household formation age groups, a 
fall in average household size and a large net inflow of returning emigrants and 
immigrants, (OECD, 2006). Despite rapid price growth the demand for dwellings 
remained high. Although houses have been highly priced to purchase, 
homeowners benefited due to low interest rates and high capital gains.  
 
The current situation is now very different to the experience of the boom, with 
housing market activity adversely affected by income cuts, higher taxation and 
higher unemployment. Despite the severe impact of the housing market crash 
and Great Recession in Ireland, data from Census 2011 show that the number of 
households in the country increased by 187,112 from the previous Census. Much 
of this new household formation was among households which rent, of which 
there was an increase of 152,000. The distribution of household types and 
patterns of household formation have changed greatly over time in Ireland, so 
that Ireland today more closely resembles the behaviour observed 
internationally, although headship rates are still lower than those experienced in 
many other economies. This paper seeks to provide some insights into these 
changes. 
 
 
1  This paper was prepared as part of a research programme funded jointly by the National Asset Management Agency 
(NAMA) and the Irish Banking Federation (IBF). 
* David.Duffy@esri.ie; David.Byrne@esri.ie; John.Fitzgerald@esri.ie 
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Demographics and Household Formation 
As shown in Figure 1, the number of private households in Ireland at the time of 
Census 1966 was just over 687,000. Around the time of the start of the Celtic 
Tiger phase of recent economic growth, the number of households had increased 
to 1.1 million (Census 1996). The number of private households in Ireland grew 
from 1.12 million in 1996 to 1.65 million in 2011. This includes an increase of 12.6 
per cent, or 187,000 households, between Census 2006 and 2011. 
 
FIGURE 1 Number of Private Households, 1926-2011 
 
Source:  Central Statistics Office. 
 
Population Trends 
Before looking at the changes in household composition we first examine 
changes in the population structure. Table 1 shows the population level and the 
change in population from the four most recent Censuses. Between 2006 and 
2011 the population grew by 8.2 per cent, an annual average increase of 1.6 per 
cent.  
 
A comparison of the population in 2011 with 2006 shows that the number of 
people in Ireland increased across all age groups, except those aged 15-29 years 
which showed a slight decline. This decrease reflects, in part, the decline in births 
in the late 1980s and early 1990s, as well as the impact of migration. 
 
The data also point to increasing longevity. The share of the population aged over 
65 years increased by 14.4 per cent between 2006 and 2011. This increase among 
older age groups is particularly evident in the male population, which grew by 
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17.5 per cent, compared to growth of 12 per cent in the female population. These 
changes likely reflect the impact of improving health on the longevity of the Irish 
male population, which is traditionally shorter lived than the female population. 
 
TABLE 1 Population by Age Group, 1996-2011 
 
Population, ’000s % Change from Previous Census 
 
1996 2002 2006 2011 
 
1996 2002 2006 2011 
Age Group 
        <25 1,492.3 1,469.0  1,497.2 1,559.8 
 
-3.2 -1.6 1.9 4.2 
25-29 259.0  312.7  373.1 361.1 
 
5.2 20.7 19.3 -3.2 
30 - 34 260.9  304.7  349.4  393.9 
 
4.7 16.8 14.7 12.8 
35 - 39 255.7  290.9  322.1  364.3 
 
7.5 13.8 10.7 13.1 
40 - 44 240.4  272.0  301.3  330.8 
 
6.5 13.1 10.8 9.8 
45 - 49 225.4  249.6  274.7  305.2 
 
20.0 10.7 10.1 11.1 
50 - 54 186.6  230.8  247.1  274.4 
 
19.0 23.7 7.0 11.1 
55 - 59 153.8  197.3  225.3  244.5 
 
7.9 28.3 14.2 8.5 
60 - 64 137.9  154.3  181.7  218.8 
 
2.5 11.8 17.8 20.4 
65+ 413.9  436.0  467.9  535.4  
 
2.7 5.3 7.3 14.4 
All Ages 3,626.1  3,917.2  4,239.8  4,588.3 
 
2.8 8.0 8.2 8.2 
Source:  Central Statistics Office, Census of Population. 
 
Factors Affecting Population Change 
The natural rate of population change, the difference in the birth rate and death 
rate, and migration are the drivers of population change.  The natural increase in 
the population (births less deaths) reached an annual average of 45,000 in the 
period 2006-2011. The impact of net migration is also evident from Figure 2; 
there was a net annual average inflow of 48,000 persons between the Census in 
2002 and in 2006. The inflow fell back to an annual average of 25,000 in the most 
recent intercensal period. Data from the CSO’s annual Population and Migration 
Estimates show that net migration flows have been negative since 2011, reducing 
the rate of population growth.  
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FIGURE 2 Components of Population Change 
 
Source:  Central Statistics Office, Census of Population. 
 
Marital Status and Living Arrangements 
New households may form in a variety of structures and for a number of reasons. 
This process is closely linked to an individual’s age and life stage, for instance 
setting up or joining a household independent of the parental household. This 
may involve living alone, cohabiting with a partner or sharing a residence with a 
number of individuals. Larger households may also split, forming a number of 
smaller ones. This may happen, for instance, in the case of marriage break-up or 
separation. Trends in the size and structure of households in Ireland thus affect 
the total number of households in existence and the type and size of housing 
appropriate to match demand. Ireland has typically seen lower household 
formation among young people than is seen in the UK and the rest of Northern 
and Western Europe (Mandic, 2008). The number of occupants per household 
has also traditionally been large in Ireland relative to its neighbours, particularly 
because of the higher birth rate and younger age of the population.2  
 
The proportion of the population aged 15 years and over whose marital status is 
classed as single has fallen to 41.7 per cent in Census 2011, from 43.1 per cent in 
2006. The married/cohabiting proportion increased to 47.3 per cent from 46.1 
per cent in 2006, while the proportion separated or divorced grew from 4.9 per 
cent in 2006 to 5.7 per cent in 2011.  
 
2  In older populations children are more likely to have grown-up and left home leaving more “empty nest” households. 
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The number of people living in private households grew to 4.5 million in 2011, an 
increase of 9.4 per cent on Census 2006. The average number of persons per 
household at the time of Census 2011 was 2.73 persons, falling from 2.81 in 2006. 
This represents a continuation of a long-run trend of decreasing household sizes 
in Ireland, as depicted in Figure 3.  
 
FIGURE 3  Average Number of Persons per Household, 1926-2011 
 
Source:  Central Statistics Office. 
 
Although average household size in Ireland has fallen it remains above that of 
many other economies. Office for National Statistics data for the United Kingdom 
show that average household size fell from 3.01 persons in 1961 to 2.36 persons 
in 2011. For the United States, the average number of persons per household has 
fallen from 3.29 persons in 1960 to 2.58 persons in 2010. Data for Germany show 
a lower number of persons per household, 2.27 in 1991, declining to 2.02 persons 
by 2011, (Federal Statistics Office, 2013).  
 
Couples with children remain the most common household type in Ireland, 
numbering 608,329 in 2011. Their share in all households has fallen from 44.5  to 
36.8 per cent between the 1996 and 2011 Censuses, however. Couples without 
children increased in proportion from 18.9 to 20.2 per cent over the same period, 
while one-person households have also risen from 21.5 to 23.7 per cent.  
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Household Composition – International Comparison 
We use data from the national statistics institutes of the United Kingdom, France 
and Germany to compare their distributions of household types with that of 
Ireland. The types of household considered are those consisting of one person, 
couples (with or without children), single-parent families and “other types”, 
typically unrelated persons or multiple families living together in one household. 
 
TABLE 2 Household Type by Country, Per Cent of Households 
 
Type of Household Ireland UK France Germany 
Couple 57.0 56.1  52.7  50.6 
  with children 36.8  28.4  26.8  21.9 
  without children 20.2  27.7  25.9  28.7  
Single-parent family 12.0  10.5  8.3  6.5  
Other Households: 31.0 33.5 39.0 42.8 
Of which: 
      Single person 23.7  29.0 33.8  
   Other types 7.3  4.4    5.2    
Of which: 
      Unrelated persons 6.2  3.5        
  Multi-family 1.1  1.0        
Total 100.0  100.0  100.0  100.0  
Source:  CSO, ONS, INSEE, Destatis, own calculations. 
 
Table 2 describes the distribution of household types across these countries. It is 
notable that Ireland has the highest proportion of married/cohabiting couples. 
The result is even more striking among those couples with children. At 36.8 per 
cent, the proportion of couples with children in Ireland exceeds those of the UK, 
the country with the second-greatest proportion, by 7.4 percentage points. 
Ireland also has the greatest proportion of single-parent families, while having 
the lowest proportion of couples without children. These results are likely 
attributable to the differing age structures and trends in the Total Fertility Rate 
between these countries.3 Ireland has both a younger population and a higher 
birth rate than the other countries examined. 
 
There exist methodological differences between the countries in the reporting of 
single person household and “other types” of households. Destatis (Germany) 
does not report “other” households, such as those consisting of multiple families 
 
3  The proportion of single-parent families may also be affected by social welfare rules which provide for assistance to 
single-parent families, assistance which might not be paid to couples. 
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or non-family households such as those made up of unrelated persons, instead 
distributing these households to the “single person". The CSO (Ireland) and ONS 
(UK) report “other types” of households, broken down by their constituent parts. 
INSEE (France) reports the aggregate proportion of “other” households. 
 
The proportion of single-person households is particularly elevated in Germany 
due to the measurement methodology, although it is also likely to be high given 
that it has the greatest proportions of widowed or divorced individuals of these 
countries. The total proportion of other households (excluding couples and lone 
parents) is also higher in Germany than in Ireland. Comparing Ireland, the UK and 
France, we see that Ireland has the lowest proportion of single-person 
households. Contributing to this is the smaller proportions of widowed 
individuals and of divorced/separated individuals, reflecting again Ireland’s 
younger population and the relatively recent legalisation of divorce. The smaller 
proportion of single-person households matches with other data which suggest 
that the average size of a household in Ireland is higher than in the UK, for 
instance. Ireland also has the highest observed proportion of “other types” of 
households. The difference with respect to the United Kingdom is mainly in the 
proportion of households made up of unrelated persons, with the proportion of 
multi-family households similar between the two countries. This higher share in 
Ireland of households of unrelated persons sharing the same dwelling may reflect 
a higher cost of establishing an independent household. 
 
Headship Rates 
The headship rate provides one measure of the rate of household formation. The 
headship rate is the proportion of individuals in an age cohort that list themselves 
as “head of household” or “principal reference person” in the Census or in the 
Quarterly National Household Survey (QNHS). Each household provides one 
reference person, thus an increase in the headship rate reveals an increase in the 
number of households. In recent years Ireland has seen increases in headship 
rates and household formation at earlier ages. The headship rate for the total 
population rose from 29 per cent in 1991 to 36 per cent in 2011.  
 
Appendix Table A1 shows the headship rate for Ireland by gender and age group 
from Census 1991 to Census 2011.  The data point to increasing headship rates, 
particularly in the younger age groups. The data show a particularly strong 
increase in the female headship rate. While this may in part be driven by an 
increasing proportion of females being responsible for completing the Census 
questionnaire for the household, it is also due to an increasing number of 
households being formed by females. 
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Using Census data may introduce an element of response bias along gender lines. 
The process by which a household decides on the reference person may not be 
random; culture or tradition may play an important role in the decision. Patterns 
in the formation of partnerships are also likely to be important. As these factors 
may vary from country to country, comparison across countries requires care. In 
comparing headship rates across countries and time, we thus use the headship 
rates for the total population, male and female, to avoid issues of gender bias. 
 
Figure 4 shows the increase in headship rates in Ireland across age groups 
between the Censuses 2002, 2006 and 2011. Ireland has traditionally had lower 
headship rates than the United Kingdom. This remains true in 2011, as depicted 
in Figure 5. Across all age-groups, however, headship rates in Ireland grew closer 
to those of the UK over the period. This is largely down to growth in the Irish 
rates, although Northern Ireland, England and Wales showed falls in the headship 
rates of their younger cohorts (less than 39 in age) over the decade.  The change 
in behaviour over time and across countries may reflect differences in culture, 
differences in the relative cost of establishing an independent household, and 
different patterns of attendance by students at third level colleges.4 
 
FIGURE 4 Headship Rates, Ireland 2002-2011 
 
Source:  Own Estimates based on data from Central Statistics Office, Census of Population. 
 
 
 
 
 
4 In the UK it is more normal for students to live in university accommodation whereas in Ireland students, wherever 
possible, tend to live at home with their parents. 
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FIGURE 5 Headship Rates, Ireland, Northern Ireland, England and Wales, 2011 
 
Source:  CSO, Northern Ireland Statistical and Research Agency and Office for National Statistics. 
 
We also examine data from the French Census 2010 to compare French 
household formation with that of Ireland. We use data on the population and on 
household reference persons by age and sex to derive headship rates which are 
comparable to Irish data. These headship rates are reported in Table 3, 
aggregated to the total population to avoid the gender bias problem mentioned 
above. This bias exists in all age groups in the French data. For example, among 
those aged 25 to 39, the headship rates are 83 per cent for males and 22 per 
cent for females. By contrast, the Irish rates are 47 per cent and 42 per cent for 
men and women respectively.  
 
Table 3 shows that France has greater headship rates than Ireland across all age 
groups. Equivalently, this means that there is a greater proportion of 
independent households in France than in Ireland. The difference between the 
two countries is particularly striking among those aged under 39. For those aged 
15 to 24, the French headship rate for the total population is 17 per cent; eight 
percentage points higher than in Ireland. Among those aged 25 to 39 the 
difference in favour of France also stands at eight percentage points. As with the 
UK, this difference in behaviour may reflect differences in relative cost, 
differences in preferences or differences in the pattern of attendance at third 
level institutions. 
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TABLE 3 Headship Rate for the Total Population, Ireland and France. 
 
Country 
Age Group Ireland France Difference 
15-24 0.10 0.17 -0.08 
25-39 0.45 0.52 -0.08 
40-54 0.54 0.59 -0.05 
55-64 0.58 0.61 -0.03 
65+ 0.63 0.66 -0.03 
Source:  CSO and INSEE, own calculations. 
 
These data show that while headship rates in Ireland have grown, they still lie 
below those observed in the other countries considered in this note. 
 
Future Headship Rates 
The analysis above outlines Ireland’s increasing headship rates. However, until 
further research into the factors driving these changes is complete it is difficult 
to forecast how headship rates will change over the rest of the decade. Instead, 
using the ESRI’s Demographic Model we consider a series of scenarios for the 
future. These scenarios consider how the number of households might be 
affected by a range of alternative assumptions on headship rates ranging from 
unchanging headship rates compared to 2011 up to full convergence of Irish 
behaviour to that currently observed in the other countries considered. 
 
There are a number of alternative approaches, which allows us to test the 
sensitivity of our estimates. In each case the assumptions on headship rates are 
applied to the ESRI demographic model and estimates of the number of 
households are made out to 2030. The model is calibrated to the Recovery 
Scenario in FitzGerald and Kearney, 2013. 
 
In the “Recovery” scenario, the EU economy is assumed to return to a 
reasonable rate of growth over the rest of the decade. It is also assumed that 
the continuing problems in the Irish financial sector are tackled effectively. 
Under these circumstances, the export sector of the economy would see its 
markets grow, resulting in increases in output and employment. In turn, growth 
in foreign demand would help produce a turnaround in domestic demand. As 
firms increase their sales and their profitability they would need to invest to 
continue growing. With rising real personal incomes and growth in employment, 
consumption would also begin growing again. Overall, this scenario would see 
growth in GNP of around 3.5 per cent a year in the second half of the decade. 
While the economy would not be likely to reach full employment by 2020, the 
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level of unemployment could be more than halved to around 6 per cent. The 
recovery itself would play a major role in restoring the public finances to a 
sustainable path. This would allow a shift to a more neutral fiscal stance from 
2015 onwards that would be much more supportive of growth. 
 
The forecast of the number of independent households is calculated as the 
product of the population forecasts and headship rate forecasts, again by age 
and by sex. Four different approaches are used to project future household 
formation: 
• The first approach is to assume unchanging headship rates from 2011. 
• The second approach which we employ follows the methodology outlined in 
the United Kingdom’s Department for Communities and Local Government 
(2013). This methodology fits an exponential trend between the headship 
data from a pair of Census years. This trend is then used to project forward 
the rates, which are produced by sex and five-year cohort. We first use the 
headship data of Censuses 2002 and 2011 to estimate the trend.  
• A third scenario uses Censuses 2006 and 2011 for comparison. Using the pre- 
and post-boom Censuses allows us to construct scenarios on future headship 
based on the trend over a longer period, avoiding short-term impacts of 
Ireland’s property bubble.  
• The fourth approach assumes that Irish headship rates converge to those of 
the UK by 2030.  
 
Scenario 1: Unchanging Headship Rates 
Although headship rates in Ireland have been rising, for our base scenario we 
assume that headship rates remain at their 2011 level. Although this is a 
simplifying assumption it provides a base against which the alternative scenarios 
can be compared. 
 
If there is no change in headship rates the number of households increases to 
just over 2 million by 2030. Thus, in the absence of any change in headship, 
population change would result in annual average new household formation of 
19,400 households per annum. By 2030, the number of households would be 
356,000 higher than in 2011. 
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FIGURE 6 Scenario 1 – Number of Households, Ireland, Constant Headship 
 
 
 
Scenario 2: Headship Trend: Census 2002 – Census 2011 
In this approach we make the simplifying assumption that the trend rise in 
headship rates between Census 2002 and 2011 continues out to 2031. On this 
basis we estimate that the number of households would reach 2.14 million in 
2030, from 1.65 million in 2011, as depicted in Figure 7. By 2020, the expected 
number of households would be 207,000 higher than in 2011, in 2025 this would 
have reached 340,000 and by 2030 the difference would be 480,000. 
 
FIGURE 7 Scenario 2 – Number of Households, Ireland, Headship Trend: Census 2002 – Census 2011 
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This scenario suggests a continued decline in the average number of persons per 
household so that by 2030 the average number of persons per household drops 
below 2.5 persons.  
 
Scenario 3: Headship Trend: Census 2006 – Census 2011 
As an initial sensitivity test we estimate new household formation based on the 
trend between Census 2006 and 2011. This trend captures the rise in headship 
that occurred over the period, as shown above in Figure 4. However, headship 
trends in this period may reflect the impact of the housing market boom and 
bust, rather than underlying trends. Using this time period, the number of 
households would reach 2.29 million in 2030, from 1.65 million in 2011, an 
increase of 635,000 on the 2011 level. Given our population forecasts this would 
suggest that the number of persons per household would decline to an average 
of 2.25. Figure 8 compares our base forecast with trends based on the shorter 
time period.  
 
FIGURE 8 Forecast Number of Households, Ireland, 2030, Headship Trend: Census 2006 – Census 2011 
 
 
Scenario 4: Headship Trend: Converging to UK Levels by 2030 
We considered the number of households that would be formed if Ireland 
converges by 2030 to the headship rates that prevail in England and Wales, 
based on UK Census 2011. We use England and Wales as our comparison as 
these countries have already experienced the demographic trends currently 
underway in Ireland, for example population aging. The numbers of new 
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households that would be formed by 2030 under this scenario would not be 
very different from our base scenario whereby the trend between Census 2002 
and 2011 continues to 2030, as shown in Figure 9. Converging to current 
headship rates in England and Wales implies that the number of households 
would reach 2.15 million, an additional 499,000 households on the level in 2011.  
 
FIGURE 9 Forecast Number of Households, Ireland, Headship Converging to England and Wales 2011 Rate by 
 2030 
 
 
The Role of Migration Flows 
Net migration plays an important role in determining the number of households. 
Census 2011 showed that 11.3 per cent of the population was of a foreign 
nationality. Duffy (2007) showed that migrants to Ireland tend to have higher 
headship rates than the Irish-born population. Byrne, Duffy and Fitzgerald 
(forthcoming) find the same result in analysis of micro-data from the Quarterly 
National Household Survey. These results suggest that immigration raises the 
demand for housing in Ireland through its effect on household formation. The 
ESRI’s Medium-Term Review (2013) estimates that between 2003 and 2006 net 
migration contributed 17,500 units to housing demand per annum.  
 
Our base case, drawn from the Medium-Term Review “Recovery” Scenario 
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to 2025. The Medium-Term Review estimates that migration flows added 17,500 
units per annum to housing demand between 2003 and 2006. This fell to 5,400 
units a year between 2007 and 2011 and in the current period, 2012 to 2016, it 
is estimated that the net outflow from Ireland is reducing the demand for 
housing by approximately 4,700 per annum. To test the sensitivity of our 
forecast to assumptions regarding migration flows we look at two alternatives – 
adjusting upwards or downwards the net migration assumption by 15,000 per 
annum compared to the “Recovery” Scenario. The baseline, higher emigration 
and higher immigration scenarios are depicted in Figure 9.  Higher net inflows 
would lead to the formation of 607,000 new households by 2030, compared 
with 480,000 in our base case. In contrast, higher net outflows reduce the 
number of new households formed to 355,000 between 2011 and 2030. As is 
evident from Figure 10, the effect of higher emigration is to reduce the 
contribution of population growth to household formation and so under this 
scenario the outcome is virtually identical to the scenario where headship rates 
are held constant at 2011 levels. 
 
FIGURE 10  Forecast Number of Households, Ireland, Alternative Migration Assumptions 
 
 
Discussion 
Table 4 summarises the results under the different scenarios.  These scenarios 
point to the number of households rising to above 2 million by 2030. The extent 
of the growth depends on a variety of factors including trends in headship and 
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TABLE 4 Summary of Scenarios for Number of Households in Ireland by 2030 
 
Number of 
Households, 2030 
Increase, 
2011-2030 
Annual average 
Increase, 2011-2030 
Base: Headship constant at 2011 
rates 2.01 million 356,000 19,400 
Trend in headship: Census  
2002-2011 2.14 million 481,000 25,600 
Trend in headship: Census  
2006-2011 2.29 million 635,000 33,300 
Converge to 2011 headship rates in 
England and Wales by 2030 2.15 million 499,000 26,500 
Higher Immigration, +15,000 per 
annum 2.26 million 607,000 31,900 
Higher Emigration, +15,000 per 
annum 2.01 million 355,000 19,000 
 
Across a range of scenarios demographic factors indicate that the rate of new 
household formation could be at least 20,000 per annum. In calculating the 
actual demographic pressure on the housing stock account must also be taken 
of the availability of vacant dwellings at the beginning of the period and also 
demand for additional holiday homes and replacement dwellings. Currently, 
there appears to be a very limited stock of vacant dwelling in high demand areas 
such as Dublin so that the increased number of households will require 
additional dwellings. In addition, past experience suggests that obsolescence 
could account for around 5,000 dwellings a year. Taken together, these results 
suggest an ongoing need for at least 25,000 new dwellings a year over the 
coming fifteen years. 
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APPENDIX TABLE A1 Headship Rate by Gender and Age Group, % 
 
1991 1996 2002 2006 2011 
Male 
     20-24 13.3 12.9 14.9 15.2 14.7 
25-29 44.1 37.2 31.1 31.5 32.1 
30-34 68.6 63.0 51.2 49.3 49.5 
35-39 77.7 74.1 62.6 59.3 59.5 
40-44 81.9 79.1 69.8 65.9 66.2 
45-49 85.1 82.4 74.3 71.2 70.7 
50-54 86.3 85.4 77.3 75.4 75.2 
55-59 87.1 86.7 80.4 78.5 78.3 
60-64 86.8 87.1 81.5 81.2 81.0 
65 and over 80.9 82.4 79.9 80.0 81.5 
 
1991 1996 2002 2006 2011 
Female 
     20-24 13.8 17.0 22.9 23.4 22.6 
25-29 15.0 21.5 31.2 36.2 38.5 
30-34 16.6 22.6 34.7 40.7 44.4 
35-39 17.0 23.0 33.1 38.8 42.5 
40-44 16.2 23.0 32.0 36.4 39.9 
45-49 16.8 21.9 30.4 35.6 38.1 
50-54 18.9 22.6 29.0 34.4 37.3 
55-59 23.8 24.9 29.3 33.2 36.1 
60-64 31.8 31.3 32.0 33.6 35.0 
65 and over 45.2 47.7 48.2 48.8 47.6 
 
1991 1996 2002 2006 2011 
Total 
     20-24 13.5 14.9 18.9 19.3 18.7 
25-29 29.3 29.3 31.2 33.8 35.4 
30-34 42.4 42.4 42.9 45.0 46.9 
35-39 47.3 48.2 47.8 49.2 51.0 
40-44 49.3 51.0 50.8 51.3 53.1 
45-49 51.5 52.5 52.4 53.5 54.3 
50-54 53.2 54.5 53.4 55.1 56.2 
55-59 55.6 56.2 55.2 56.1 57.2 
60-64 58.6 59.1 56.9 57.6 58.1 
65 and over 60.6 62.6 61.9 62.6 63.0 
All ages 28.9 31.0 32.9 34.7 36.1 
Source:  Based on Central Statistics Office data. 
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The Structural Balance for Ireland 
*Adele Bergin, John FitzGerald 
 
Introduction 
The concept of the structural balance has considerable significance as a key 
target for fiscal policy. However, while the concept of the structural balance is 
enshrined in legislation, the precise definition of the structural balance is not 
clear, even if the broad meaning of the concept is well understood.1 This note 
considers different approaches to estimating the structural balance and, using an 
appropriate methodology, it provides an estimate of the structural balance for 
2014. In turn, this provides a preliminary guide to the appropriate stance for fiscal 
policy in 2015. 
 
The structural balance is the government sector’s surplus or deficit after factoring 
out the current cyclical position – in other words, when the economy is operating 
in equilibrium. In turn, the economy is in equilibrium when actual output is equal 
to the output that the economy can sustain, commonly referred to as potential 
output. The actual deficit then differs from this structural deficit due to “cyclical 
factors” reflecting the fact that the economy is not operating at its equilibrium or 
due to “one off measures”. Given Ireland’s debt level, which in 2012 was the 
fourth highest in the EU-27, the objective for government, formalised in 
legislation, is to restore the government sector’s structural deficit to balance or a 
small surplus. Under the terms of the adjustment programme, agreed with the EU 
Commission, Ireland has been permitted to adopt a more gradual adjustment 
path to eliminating the structural deficit than would normally be required under 
the Stability and Growth Pact. Nonetheless, for 2015 the requirement, consistent 
with the legislation, is to have the actual government deficit below 3 per cent of 
GDP. Beyond that date the requirement is to eliminate the structural deficit 
entirely consistent with the requirements of the Medium-Term Objective (MTO) 
set out as part of the Stability and Growth Pact (SGP). The estimate of the 
structural deficit, therefore, is crucial to determining the degree of further fiscal 
adjustment that may be required. 
 
 
1  In the Fiscal Responsibility Act 2012 it is defined as: “annual structural balance of the general government”, in relation 
to a year, means the general government deficit or general government surplus for the year, cyclically adjusted and 
net of one-off and temporary measures, expressed as a percentage of gross domestic product at market prices. 
* adele.bergin@esri.ie; john.fitzgerald@esri.ie 
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There are many different ways to define the structural balance and the related 
concept of potential output. In the approach that is used by the EU Commission, 
potential output is defined as the level of output consistent with price and labour 
market equilibrium – when there is no inflationary pressure on wages or prices. 
However, while this harmonised methodology is appropriate for some EU 
countries, the measure of labour market equilibrium used and how it is calculated 
is inappropriate for Ireland. In particular, it takes no account of whether the 
economy as a whole is in equilibrium – for example whether the current account 
balance is consistent with long-term equilibrium.  
 
In this Article we first consider the appropriate definition of the structural 
balance for Ireland. We then consider how this approach is applied by the EU 
Commission, using the EU methodology, and the defects with this approach. We 
then present an alternative approach and apply it to the Irish economy today. In 
the final section of this Note we consider the implications of these results for the 
appropriate stance of fiscal policy in 2015.  
 
Defining the Structural Balance 
There are a number of different ways of measuring the potential output of the 
economy. All of these methods aim to estimate what level of output would be 
consistent with stable inflation, given the endowment of resources in the 
economy. Some of the methods take account of the specific structure and factor 
endowments of an economy while others are little more than a rule of thumb.  
 
For potential output to be sustainable there should simultaneously be 
equilibrium in key markets – on the current account (the goods market), in the 
labour market (full employment consistent with stable inflation), households 
should have adjusted their consumption (and savings) so that their debt to 
income ratio is sustainable, the factor input mix (e.g., capital and labour) 
employed by companies should be chosen to minimise their costs of production 
and the housing market should also be in long-term equilibrium. The government 
accounts must also be on a sustainable path when the economy is in equilibrium 
– e.g., in balance or showing a small surplus.2 In some approaches to modelling 
potential output these equilibrium conditions are not necessarily all guaranteed 
or imposed. For example, in the approach currently used by the EU to estimate 
potential output a particular definition of labour market equilibrium is used and it 
takes no account of other possible disequilibria in the economy. In the case of 
 
2  The government accounts can in principle be in equilibrium with a small deficit if the debt stock is not starting from an 
excessive level. 
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Ireland, one of the most important disequilibria that is missing from this 
approach is the current account. Other research has shown that incorporating 
information about the financial cycle can also be important.3 
 
Once potential output is defined, we can then estimate what the budget deficit or 
surplus would be if actual output were equal to its potential.  The structural 
balance for the government is estimated using a model that relates the major 
public finance aggregates to the level of GDP and its components.4 The difference 
between this “structural balance” and the actual balance is then attributable to 
both cyclical and temporary one-off factors which explain why the economy is 
not in equilibrium. 
 
EU Approach and Alternative Approaches to Measuring Structural Balance 
The European Commission uses a production function methodology for 
calculating potential growth rates and output gaps. The methodology is 
extensively described in D’Auria et al. (2010). The approach uses a simple Cobb 
Douglas specification where potential output depends on a combination of factor 
inputs (capital and labour) multiplied by total factor productivity. The trend 
components of the individual factors (apart from capital) are estimated and an 
estimate of potential output is obtained by substituting the estimates of potential 
employment, trend efficiency and actual capital into the production function. 
D’Auria et al. (2010) argue that the results provide an indication of likely 
developments if past trends were to persist into the future and cannot be 
interpreted in terms of medium-term sustainable growth rates.  
 
The EU Commission applies exactly the same approach to calculating the 
structural balance to all member states. Of necessity, this one size fits all 
approach requires that similar parameters must be used for each country.5 
However, while this methodology provides a reasonable way of estimating the 
structural balance for some EU countries, this uniform approach is not well suited 
to the characteristics of the Irish economy.6 The Department of Finance as long 
 
3  C. Borio, P. Disyatat and M. Juselius, (2013). “Rethinking potential output: Embedding information about the financial 
cycle”, Bank for International Settlements Working Papers No 404. 
4  The model may be a single equation or a more complex set of relationships between public finance aggregates and 
key economic aggregates. 
5  This approach is adopted because it is not realistic to expect the Council of Ministers to debate the precise parameters 
of the production function or other similar technical issues for each individual country. 
6  See http://www.bruegel.org/nc/blog/detail/article/1176-blogs-review-the-structural-balance-controversy/ for a 
discussion of the shortcomings of this approach. 
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ago as 2004 drew attention to its inadequacies in an Irish context and the EU 
Commission itself has recognised these problems.7  
 
Figure 1 shows estimates of the potential growth rate for Ireland for the years 
2004 to 2014 using this methodology. These estimates are available from the 
European Commission (EC) through the CIRCABC website.8 Klär (2013) points to 
the volatility of the estimates and how they have been subject to substantial 
revisions since the onset of the financial crisis. The figure clearly shows that 
estimates of potential output for any year can change over time, in some cases 
quite considerably, as new data become available and the estimation 
methodology is changed. The downwards revisions to the potential growth rate 
for more recent years is striking. The line in the graph shows the percentage point 
difference in projections for potential output growth between the Winter 2014 
and one year ahead estimates of potential growth.9  
 
FIGURE 1 European Commission Estimates of the Potential Growth Rate 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
7  In their Ireland –Stability Programme: December 2003 Update the Department of Finance provided a detailed critique 
of the EU methodology http://budget.gov.ie/Budgets/2004/Stability.aspx . They ended by saying: “This volatility in the 
estimates of the NAIRU (over a period of less than one year) is unhelpful in applying the CABB methodology for 
Ireland.” 
8  See: https://circabc.europa.eu/faces/jsp/extension/wai/navigation/container.jsp 
9  One year ahead forecasts refer to the forecast for potential output in 2008 made in 2007, the forecast for 2007 made 
in 2006 etc. We use the one year ahead forecasts as this information is likely to be used in planning policy for the next 
year. 
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Interestingly, estimates of potential growth before the crisis have been revised 
downwards. One of the concerns in this note is that the estimate of potential 
growth for any given year, based on the current EU methodology, is a moving 
target and, as such, it is not an appropriate basis on which to base fiscal policy. 
 
FIGURE 2 European Commission Estimates of the Contribution of Components to Potential Growth 
 
 
Figure 2 shows the contributions from labour, capital and total factor productivity 
to potential growth from the February 2014 European Commission estimates. 
The graph shows that the contribution from the labour input is negative over the 
period 2009 to 2013. Klär (2013) notes that the revisions to potential growth for 
Ireland are largely driven by a decrease in labour inputs so here we examine the 
treatment of the Irish labour market in the EU methodology for estimating 
potential output more closely.  
 
The EU methodology for calculating the trend labour input involves several steps. 
Labour input is defined in terms of hours. The trend labour force is obtained by 
mechanically detrending the participation rate (using a HP filter) and applying it 
to the population of working age. Then trend unemployment, consistent with 
stable non-accelerating wage inflation (NAWRU), is estimated using a statistical 
technique. Potential labour supply (trend hours worked) is then obtained by 
multiplying trend employment with the trend of average hours worked.   
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There are two key problems with this approach.10 First, as discussed above, 
because it only focuses on imbalances in the labour market it may well reach 
inappropriate conclusions – for example, ignoring imbalances on the current 
account. Second, the methodology used to measure the disequilibrium in the 
labour market (to calculate a NAWRU), produces particularly strange conclusions 
for Ireland because it does not take account of the extensive research on how the 
Irish labour market actually operates. This latter point is probably the most 
controversial aspect of the EU methodology. 
 
The methodology underlying the estimation of the NAWRU is based on the Philips 
curve and it is not an appropriate model of wage formation for a country with a 
very open labour market, where migration responds to (relative) wages or 
relative unemployment. Figure 3 shows the EU estimates of the NAWRU, 
together with the actual unemployment rate from the CSO. The graph shows that 
in 2013 the NAWRU was very close to the actual unemployment rate, suggesting 
that actual employment was close to potential. It also shows that, prior to the 
crisis, the long-run equilibrium unemployment rate was below or only slightly 
above the actual unemployment rate. If, as seems likely, the actual 
unemployment rate falls below this estimate of the NAWRU in 2014, this would 
imply ‘excess employment’ in the economy (Darvas, 2013). Darvas (2013) 
comments “In other words, almost all presently unemployed people are regarded 
as useless from the perspective of the production potential of the economy. This 
is strange indeed, even though it may be difficult to employ all former 
construction workers in other sectors in the coming years.” If employment is 
close to potential, output is, by definition, close to potential and this implies that 
the structural balance is also close to the actual government balance.   
 
Using the EU methodology, the Stability Programme 2013 estimated that the 
structural deficit for Ireland for 2014 will be 4.6 per cent of GDP with the 
economy producing close to potential output. With the economy assumed to be 
producing at capacity, this deficit would have to be eliminated by discretionary 
fiscal policy action in the future to restore the economy to long-term equilibrium 
consistent with the legislation.  
 
 
 
 
 
10  An additional problem is that the EU approach uses the actual capital stock rather than the equilibrium capital stock. It 
can be argued that the capital stock in 2008 was excessive. 
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FIGURE 3 European Commission Estimates of the NAWRU 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Bergin et al., 2013, consider the impact of different fiscal policy instruments on 
key economic aggregates including GNP, the government balance and the current 
account balance. This paper shows that whichever fiscal instruments were chosen 
to eliminate such a structural deficit, there would be a matching impact on the 
current account balance. Thus, if cuts in public expenditure were used to reduce 
the structural deficit by 4.6 percentage points of GDP, the current account 
surplus would be increased by a similar magnitude.11 With the current account 
surplus for 2014 forecast to be almost 8 per cent of GDP,12 this would mean that 
the effect of eliminating the structural deficit of 4.6 per cent of GDP, as defined 
by the EU, would be to eventually raise the current account surplus to 12.6 per 
cent of GDP.  
 
A surplus of this magnitude would be a very clear sign that the economy was far 
from equilibrium. Such a rate of accumulation of net foreign assets (or reduction 
in net foreign liabilities) would not be sustainable for long. At some stage 
households and companies would react to their very rapidly improving foreign 
asset/liability position by increasing investment and consumption. In turn this 
would translate into a significant improvement in the government balance. It 
would also, inevitably, see the Irish economy breaching the EU guidelines on the 
 
11  This is derived using the HERMES model and assuming that roughly half of the adjustment was carried out by 
increasing taxation and half by cutting expenditure, Bergin et al. (2013). 
12  If allowance is made for the effects of the earnings of the redomiciled plcs on the surplus, the forecast is for a surplus 
of 3.5 per cent of GDP. 
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size of the current account surplus under the European Semester’s 
Macroeconomic Imbalances Procedure (MIP).  
 
This result illustrates clearly the difficulties associated with applying the current 
EU methodology to estimate the structural balance for Ireland. This approach 
gives rise to a series of inconsistencies which suggest the need for a more 
appropriate methodology for estimating the structural balance. In particular, it is 
important to consider approaches that take into account the specific 
characteristics of the Irish labour market and the other major imbalances in the 
economy. 
 
Model Based Estimate of the Structural Balance 
The HERMES macro model, which is specified in long-run equilibrium form, is a 
suitable tool to calculate an alternative measure of the structural balance of the 
economy in the medium term.13 In the Medium-Term-Review the model was used 
to develop scenarios where the economy returns to long-run equilibrium, not 
only in the labour market, but also in a number of other important markets 
mentioned above. Equilibrium in the goods market – a current account in balance 
or limited surplus – is affected by the behaviour of households (adjusting their 
savings behaviour) and companies minimising their cost of production (choosing 
an appropriate capital stock and related path for investment), together with a 
government sector in balance. The key relationships in the HERMES model are 
specified in equilibrium form so that, when subject to shocks, the economy will 
generally return to a stable equilibrium over a number of years.14  
 
To estimate long-run equilibrium output the HERMES model is benchmarked to 
current economic conditions and it is then simulated out into the future. This 
provides a scenario where the economy returns to equilibrium and the model 
estimates the resulting government balance consistent with that equilibrium. 
Such medium-term scenarios depend on the external environment for the Irish 
economy that is assumed. Thus potential output and the structural balance are 
not independent of conditions in the rest of the EU economy. 
 
The future path of the public finances is modelled assuming a neutral fiscal policy 
from 2015 onwards – where the stance of fiscal policy is neither stimulating nor 
 
13  The latest version of the HERMES model is described in Bergin et al. (2013). 
14  As discussed in FitzGerald and Kearney (2013), there may be multiple possible equilibria depending on the 
sustainability of the level of public debt. 
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deflating the economy. This is modelled using a set of indexation rules which, for 
example, assume average direct tax rates remain unchanging over time.15 This 
scenario allows the economy to return to equilibrium, where actual output is 
equal to potential output. At the point where the economy is restored to 
equilibrium, the government balance, estimated by the model, represents the 
structural balance. If no fiscal adjustment is needed (a series of neutral budgets) 
to produce balance on the government accounts when the economy reaches its 
long-term stable equilibrium, then that defines the government balance in that 
year as being attributable to cyclical factors – the fact that the economy is 
currently out of equilibrium. To the extent that a further fiscal adjustment might 
be needed to restore the economy to equilibrium that required adjustment is a 
measure of the structural deficit. 
 
The single most important difference in this approach to measuring potential 
output and the other commonly used methodologies is that, in HERMES, account 
is taken of the fact that the Irish labour market tends to clear in the long run at an 
unemployment rate of around 5 per cent. It also takes account of the 
endogeneity of labour supply through migration (and labour force participation 
decisions). The EU methodology that is currently used implies that the 
equilibrium rate of unemployment in Ireland is well over 10 per cent. This would 
suggest that the unemployment problem is entirely structural and that the 
recovery in activity, currently under way, will have no impact on the 
unemployment rate. 
 
This EU estimate of the equilibrium rate of unemployment takes no account of a 
range of research on the Irish labour market,16 which suggests a very different 
conclusion. First, while structural unemployment is a risk in the wake of the crisis, 
an examination of the composition of unemployment shows that quite a high 
proportion have third level qualifications. This significantly increases the 
likelihood that these workers will regain employment as recovery takes hold. The 
long-term unemployment rate, a proxy for structural unemployment, has 
declined to 7.2 per cent in the most recent data – a fall of over 2 percentage 
points in under two years. Furthermore, a range of published research on the 
Irish labour market over a long period provides empirical evidence of the 
flexibility of the Irish labour market and the elastic labour supply (Barrett, 
FitzGerald and Nolan, 2002). The weight of this evidence suggests that the 
 
15  The approach and indexation rules used are set out in Bergin et al. (2013). In the indexation rules used here it is 
assumed that government investment and consumption remain unchanged in volume terms. In a growing economy 
this assumption imparts a mild deflationary bias to our set of indexation rules. 
16  The evidence is discussed in Bergin et al. (2013). See also Barrett, A., J. FitzGerald and B. Nolan (2002), “Earnings 
Inequality, Returns to Education and Immigration into Ireland”, Labour Economics, Vol. 9, No. 5. 
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likelihood that the rate of unemployment in the Irish labour market would remain 
over 10 per cent indefinitely is very low. Developments in the Irish labour market 
during the crisis and in the past year are consistent with these findings. 
 
The second important difference in approach lies in the fact that, using the 
HERMES model, long-term equilibrium is imposed, so that the current account 
surplus does not continue growing. The counterpart to this restoration of 
external balance is that the effects of the household and company sector 
deleveraging will be largely completed. This means that investment, including 
investment in housing, returns to a level that at least maintains the existing 
capital stock and is also consistent with optimising behaviour by the company 
sector. 
 
Estimating the Structural Balance Using HERMES 
In the Medium-Term Review, published in July 2013, a number of scenarios were 
set out for the future development of the Irish economy. Here we consider the 
structural deficit implied by the Recovery Scenario. Since the scenario was 
published the path of the economy has been consistent with that implied by this 
scenario. However in our conclusions we take account of the fact that there is no 
certainty that this recovery will be realised. 
 
TABLE 1 Summary Results with Indexation from 2015 Onwards 
 
2012 2013 2014 2015 2016 2017 2018 2019 2020 
GDP, % 0.2 -0.4 2.6 3.5 4.6 3.8 3.8 3.5 3.4 
GNP, % 1.8 3.3 3.5 3.7 4.7 2.9 2.8 2.6 2.5 
Unemployment rate 
ILO, percentage points 14.7 13.1 11.4 10.1 8.1 7.4 6.7 6.0 5.2 
Investment/ GNP ratio 13.1 13.4 14.5 15.7 19.2 19.8 20.6 20.9 21.1 
Non-agri wage rates, % 0.9 0.0 0.0 1.0 2.6 4.7 4.2 4.0 3.9 
Labour Share of Value 
Added except agric. 46.9 47.8 47.3 46.8 46.7 46.4 46.0 45.5 45.1 
Personal savings ratio 7.3 8.3 7.6 8.1 8.3 9.2 9.8 9.4 9.4 
Housing Completions, 
number 8,488 8,301 12,000 15,000 28,177 30,233 28,982 26,501 23,784 
Net emigration -34.4 -33.1 -18 0 0 0 0 0 0 
% of GDP 
Balance of payments 
surplus, adjusted for 
redomiciled plcs -0.1 2.1 3.5 4.3 3.7 3.7 3.5 3.6 4.0 
General government 
deficit 8.2 7 4.5 2.8 -0.2 -1.0 -1.7 -2.2 -2.6 
Note: In some cases the data definitions used in HERMES may differ from the published series. 
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The most negative scenario (Stagnation Scenario) in the Review was based on a 
failure of the EU economy to grow over the rest of the decade. Currently this 
seems less likely than it did last year. There remains a possibility that a failure to 
resolve the problems of the financial system could delay the recovery that is 
under way (the Delayed Adjustment scenario). However, this would postpone a 
return of actual output to its potential level rather than permanently damaging 
the growth rate of potential output.  
 
For this note we have rerun the Medium-Term Review Recovery scenario 
calibrating to the latest estimate of the outturn for 2013 and the forecast for 
2014 published in the current Quarterly Economic Commentary. We first set out 
some of the key aggregates from this scenario in Table 1, aggregates which show 
the economy returning to equilibrium by the later years of this decade as the 
cyclical effects of the crisis fall away. 
 
Based on the latest forecasts for EU and world demand, this scenario sees the 
economy gradually returning to equilibrium over the rest of the decade.17 The 
current account surplus stabilises at a sustainable level.18 The savings ratio also 
stabilises and rising real income is reflected in growing consumption and a return 
to normality in the housing market, with output broadly equal to the number of 
dwellings required for a rising population (see Byrne et al., in this QEC). The 
company sector returns to investing, reflecting a recovery in profitability after the 
crisis. As a result, investment stabilises at a little over 20 per cent of GNP, broadly 
consistent with the level of investment in other similar developed economies. In 
the later years of the decade wage rates rise roughly in line with the rate of 
inflation plus the rate of increase in productivity. Thus, while the labour share of 
added value decreased over the course of the crisis, having seen the economy 
return to competitiveness on foreign markets, it readjusts to a new equilibrium 
from 2015 onwards. 
 
The labour market takes somewhat longer than the rest of the economy to return 
to equilibrium. It is likely to be 2018 or 2019 before the economy approaches a 
level of unemployment which would be consistent with long-term equilibrium – 
in the range 5 to 6.5 per cent of the labour force. This level of unemployment 
would be consistent with the rate of wage inflation discussed above and with 
labour’s share of added value remaining stable at its current relatively low level. 
 
17  A full description of the assumptions underpinning the Recovery scenario, as well as detailed results are available in 
FitzGerald and Kearney, 2013. 
18  Account is taken of the effect of redomiciled plcs on the balance of payments.   
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The specification of the model and the resulting simulations ensure that: 
The labour market eventually clears. 
The current account surplus is sustainable (not too large). This is helped 
by the model specification that, in the long run, there is a stable 
relationship between household wealth, consumption and income. 
The rate of wage inflation is consistent with a constant labour share of 
added value. 
The investment to GNP ratio is consistent with stable growth 
House prices reach a new equilibrium and housing investment is 
consistent with long-run stability in the housing market. 
 
With a broadly neutral fiscal policy stance from 2015 onwards, as defined here, 
the model shows the government sector moving into surplus in 2016 with a more 
significant surplus in 2017. This shows that, conditional on the assumptions about 
the world economy being realised, the current fiscal deficit is largely attributable 
to the fact that the economy is producing well below its long-run equilibrium 
level. In other words, the structural deficit for 2014 is close to zero. This is 
dramatically lower than the number derived using the EU methodology. 
However, in this case it is consistent with an economy moving into long-term 
equilibrium, whereas the EU approach would imply a huge current account 
surplus that would not be sustainable in the medium term. 
 
Conclusions 
This analysis highlights the inappropriate nature of the EU approach to estimating 
the structural balance for Ireland. Because of the importance of this concept for 
fiscal policy it is important to develop alternative measures to the EU 
methodology. This Research Note develops one such alternative measure that 
provides more realistic results.  
 
Based on the Medium-Term Review Recovery scenario, and using the HERMES 
model of the economy, we estimate that the bulk of the government deficit in 
2014 is cyclical in nature. Assuming a neutral fiscal policy from 2015 onwards, 
when the economy is restored to equilibrium later in the decade the current 
government deficit is likely to be eliminated, to be replaced by a small surplus. If 
this scenario were to prove correct, then no further fiscal adjustment would be 
needed in 2015 to ensure that the government finances would move into surplus 
by 2017/2018.  
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However, even though the recovery in the economy has, to date, proved more 
vigorous than anticipated, there remains considerable uncertainty about the 
strength of the recovery elsewhere in the EU and also about the ability of the 
financial system to fund the ongoing recovery in Ireland. Furthermore, in order to 
maintain the credibility of Irish fiscal policy (and to meet required targets, now 
enshrined in legislation) it will be very important to ensure that the actual deficit 
for 2015 is below 3 per cent of GDP. Thus it would be premature to lock into a 
particular budgetary policy for 2015 at this point in time.  Instead, it would be 
prudent to prepare for possible further cuts next year to guard against the risk 
that the fragile recovery, currently underway, peters out. This echoes the 
recommendation we have made previously that fiscal policy should be 
formulated on a “no regrets” basis”. A final decision can be made about fiscal 
policy for 2015 at the end of September when the progress of the Irish recovery is 
somewhat clearer. 
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A Survey-based Analysis of 
Irish Savings Behaviour by 
Age 
 
Kevin Timoney* 
Introduction 
The savings behaviour of Irish households in recent years has often been 
described as precautionary. Domestic and international crises have lead to 
heightened uncertainty, persistent unemployment and low economic growth. At 
the same time, personal disposable income and personal consumption 
expenditure have been reduced. The difference between them (personal savings) 
has been large, despite a very low interest rate environment. The personal 
savings ratio has increased from an average of 4 per cent of disposable income 
for 2001-2007 to 8 per cent on average for 2008-2012. 
 
This Note uses survey data to investigate Irish savings behaviour by age during 
and since the recent crisis. The survey data are collected monthly for the 
Nationwide UK (Ireland)/ESRI Savings Index. The data are collected by telephone 
based on a nationally representative survey of over 800 respondents, with a new 
sample selected each month. In terms of response rates, approximately 50 per 
cent of private households complete the survey in full. The data are calibrated to 
population totals based on gender, age group, marital status, household size, 
education and economic status. This provides findings that are nationally 
representative.1 Survey data for the period January 2010 to February 2014 are 
analysed by three age categories: those aged 21-35, 36-50 and 51 and over. 
 
Irish Savings Behaviour by Three Age Groups 
As mentioned in the introduction, uncertainty and weak economic performance 
are often cited as explanations for the emergence of precautionary saving in 
 
1  Duffy (2010) details the survey methodology: 
http://www.esri.ie/irish_economy/savings_index/SavingsIndexMethodology.pdf 
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Ireland in recent years. However, deleveraging has also been prevalent, with loan 
drawdowns outpaced by loan repayments for several years, and bank deposits 
remaining broadly flat. The combination of credit stagnation and negative equity 
of homeowners has reduced the capacity of many households to smooth 
consumption, and the response has been one of balance-sheet consolidation. 
McCarthy and McQuinn (2014) combine survey and regulatory data, finding that 
there are negative implications for household consumption when deleveraging 
applies, and that older, affluent households are more likely to be deleveraging. 
Durkan and O’Hanlon (2012) and Gerlach-Kristen (2013) have previously used 
Household Budget Survey (HBS) data to estimate the impact of the crisis on 
household consumption and savings behaviour in 2009/10 compared to 2004/5. 
The broad conclusion arising from the HBS data is that negative income and 
wealth effects have considerably held back the profile of consumption in recent 
years, with an uncertain outlook encouraging precautionary savings to insure 
against potential loss of future income. This effect is likely to have been strongest 
among first-time buyers from the peak of the property market in the mid-2000s, 
thus especially applicable to the cohort currently aged mid-30s to mid-40s.2 
 
Meanwhile, large-scale net emigration since 2010 has been concentrated heavily 
amongst the younger age groups of the population. Conditions in the labour 
market for those aged 20-34 remain challenging, both relative to older age 
groups and in absolute terms. The Quarterly National Household Survey shows 
the unemployment rate for this age group at 15 per cent for the fourth quarter of 
2013, while annual employment growth has been negative since the second 
quarter of 2008. However, of those remaining in the country, members of the 
younger age groups are not heavily indebted as is generally the case for their 
older counterparts. As credit flows remain subdued, it is likely that many of those 
reaching the ages formerly associated with first-time buyers are planning to 
purchase later on. With fewer down payments being made on property 
purchases, and correspondingly lower debt-servicing costs, there may be a 
growing latent demand among younger age groups which are instead 
accumulating significant savings. 
 
In summary, some groups of the population have been particularly affected by 
recent net emigration, and many others that remain in Ireland carry negative 
equity from property market collapse, along with large debt-servicing costs. The 
prevalence of uncertainty in the economy may also be evident in an increased 
tendency to save as a precaution in case of lost future income. Preliminary 
indications from the survey data suggest respondents were most likely to save 
 
2  Using survey data, Duffy and Quail (2005) found 69 per cent of first-time buyers in late 2004/early 2005 were aged 25-
34. 
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with a precautionary motive earlier in the sample period, in particular during 
2011. There has also been an ongoing decline in the share of those with a 
negative view of general economic prospects for the coming year, who are also 
saving with a precautionary motive 
 
The extent to which the monthly data can be stratified by age is limited by the 
need to ensure that cell sizes remain greater than 30 cases. Survey data are 
collected for those aged 16 and over, but for the present analysis, the savings 
behaviour of ages 16-20 is not examined due to a small cell size. Furthermore, the 
majority of respondents in this age group are in education or training, implying a 
more limited ability and motivation to save. As a result, the savings behaviour of 
those aged 21 and over is analysed in this Note, with variables calculated as 
percentages of each age group’s full sample. To smooth monthly volatility, the 
analysis presents the series as three-month moving averages. 
 
FIGURE 1 Respondents Saving Occasionally or Regularly, by Three Age Groups
 
 
Source:  Nationwide UK (Ireland)/ESRI Savings Index data. 
 
As shown in Figure 1, a similar pattern has emerged since 2010 for the savings 
status of those aged 36-50 and 51 and above. Only about half of respondents 
aged 36 and over have been saving occasionally or regularly since mid-2012. The 
decreased share of the population that is saving money suggests there has been 
some decline in precautionary savings for these age groups. Meanwhile, the 
share of those aged 21-35 saving either regularly or occasionally has been broadly 
increasing over the past year. 
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A possible explanation for this relates to the low volume of transactions in the 
property market – compared to a historical average of about 3 per cent, the 
current volume of transactions is just above 1 per cent of the country’s housing 
stock.3 The effect of this is to marginalise first-time buyers, who are likely to be 
accumulating savings rather than making down payments on property and 
meeting debt-servicing costs. According to recent mortgage lending data from 
the Irish Banking Federation, just 7,535 new first-time buyer mortgages were 
drawn down in 2013, compared to an average of 14,416 between 2008 and 2010. 
Further to this, the percentage of this age cohort saving occasionally or regularly 
is possibly higher due to the past four years of net emigration, as many emigrants 
were previously unemployed and thus were less likely to be saving at all. Of those 
remaining in the country, faced with credit constraints and limited housing 
supply, the share that is saving is likely to be higher as a result. 
 
FIGURE 2 Respondents Saving Occasionally or Regularly, Expecting the Same or Increasing Savings 
 Over the Coming Six Months, by Three Age Groups
 
 
Source:  Nationwide UK (Ireland)/ESRI Savings Index data. 
 
Above, Figure 2 describes the extent to which those saving occasionally or 
regularly expect their level of savings to either remain the same or increase over 
the next six months. Consistent with the pattern in Figure 1, over time the 
youngest cohort shown (21-35 year-olds) emerges as the age group that is most 
 
3  According to the Residential Property Price Register, there has been an increase of 8 per cent in transactions volume 
for the first quarter of 2014 compared to the first quarter of 2013. However, this is likely flattered by the low 
transactions seen a year ago following the expiry of Mortgage Interest Relief at end-December 2012. 
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positively disposed towards future saving. More recently, there has been a 
growing share of those in older age groups who expect to save at least as much 
six months from now as they currently do. This proportion remains substantially 
lower than for those aged 21-35, however. 
 
Figure 3 illustrates the share of respondents saving occasionally or regularly 
whose first preference for spare money over and above everyday needs is to save 
or invest it. The series are pooled from the following four choices: invest in 
shares, save in a deposit account, place into a pension scheme, save in some 
other way. Respondents may choose between these and two other alternatives; 
whether they would use the money to pay down debt or for spending. Of the 
savings/investment-related responses, the pattern emerging is broadly similar to 
that in Figures 1 and 2, but the series is relatively higher for those aged 51 and 
over despite a reduced preference over time. The series is particularly low for the 
36-50 age group, owing to a stronger preference for debt repayment. This finding 
is consistent with more limited ability to smooth consumption for this age group, 
as a result of the negative income and wealth effects described earlier. Notably, 
the series has lately been trending upwards for those aged 21-35, further 
supporting the intuition from Figures 1 and 2 above. 
 
FIGURE 3 Respondents Saving Occasionally or Regularly, Whose First Preference for Spare Money is to  Save 
 or Invest, by Three Age Groups
 
 
Source:  Nationwide UK (Ireland)/ESRI Savings Index data. 
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Conclusion 
The past 50 months of Irish survey data on savings are analysed in this Note by 
three age groups. This exercise portrays how different circumstances facing 
various parts of the population have manifested into a range of savings patterns. 
The main findings suggest that precautionary savings, once a significant feature 
across much of the population, is likely to have become less prevalent over time. 
Older age groups have shown a reduced tendency to save money, and this is 
linked to the negative income and wealth effects resulting from the crisis period. 
In earlier years of the crisis, there is evidence of high saving amongst older age 
groups, but this effect diminishes over time. Rather, the continued high level of 
savings observed in National Accounts data today is likely to relate to widespread 
balance-sheet repair, and a growing unmet demand in the youngest cohort 
examined, those aged 21-35 years old. Respondents from this age group have 
been particularly disposed towards savings since 2010, and this finding is linked 
to trends in the property market and the high net emigration that has taken place 
in recent years. While the volume of housing-market transactions remains 
historically low, the average age of first-time buyers will tend to increase, and the 
accumulation of savings by the 21-35 age group is likely to persist. One 
implication of this is that consumption and investment for younger age groups 
may remain subdued relative to potential over the medium term. 
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